Günümüz toplumsal sözleşme geleneğini oyun teorisi üzerinden temellendirme olasılığı Rawls, Gauthier and Buchanan örnekleri.


Tezin Türü: Yüksek Lisans

Tezin Yürütüldüğü Kurum: Orta Doğu Teknik Üniversitesi, İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi, Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi Bölümü, Türkiye

Tezin Onay Tarihi: 2014

Tezin Dili: İngilizce

Öğrenci: Velihan Karavelioğlu

Danışman: MEHMET OKYAYUZ

Özet:

This thesis analyzes the concepts of social cooperation of two traditions, the social contract theory and the theory of games. Three main characteristics of social cooperation understanding of the game theory will be offered, and it will be compared with the understanding of the social cooperation of the social contract theory. The Classical Social Contract Theory does not offer any calculation of the utility. On the other side, The Contemporary Social Contract Theory provides the measurement of utility. This study has divided contemporary social contract theory as a contracting process, and a social cooperation. The Contracting process is constituted by internal constrains and in this part, individuals are ready to abandon their share to gain more in the long term. Secondly, social cooperation understanding of the contemporary social contract theory does not offer a bargaining game in which one of the parties has potential to lose share on the outcome. The Contemporary Social Contract Theory suggests that every individual should increase their share compared to the absence of cooperation, and they offer the best payoffs that is higher than the defector’s share in the prisoner’s dilemma. It is contrary to the social cooperation understanding of the theory of games.