Bargaining in legislatures over private and public goods with endogenous recognition

---

Tezin Türü: Yüksek Lisans

Tezin Yürütüldüğü Kurum: Orta Doğu Teknik Üniversitesi, İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi, İktisat Bölümü, Türkiye

Tezin Onay Tarihi: 2016

Öğrenci: HAKAN GENÇ

Danışman: SERKAN KÜÇÜKŞENEL

Özet:

In this thesis, we examine a sequential model of multilateral bargaining in which legislators make decisions over both private and public good dimensions under unanimity rule. We assume that recognition process is endogenous. Legislators expend effort to be the proposer. In symmetric case, since all legislators are identical, even if the legislators exert effort to be the proposer, model behaves like an exogenous model. However, cut-off values that indicate legislators’ political opinion differs from the previous studies. Because model pushes legislators to become collective-leaning ones. In asymmetric case, in a diverse legislature, we show that legislators come to an agreement with a decision containing both public and private good dimensions.