Lying individually or in a game in the presence of norm enforcer


Tezin Türü: Yüksek Lisans

Tezin Yürütüldüğü Kurum: Orta Doğu Teknik Üniversitesi, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Türkiye

Tezin Onay Tarihi: 2021

Tezin Dili: İngilizce

Öğrenci: KÜBRA GURALLAR

Danışman: Mürüvvet İlknur Büyükboyacı Hanay

Özet:

We conduct an online experiment to explore the role of symmetric externalities and third-party (norm enforcer) punishment on dishonest behavior. In particular, for symmetric externality treatments, we vary whether reports of group members change payoff of each other. To study how possibility of third-party punishment affects reporting behavior, we introduce a third-party with punishment option into the setting. We find that the effect of symmetric externalities on dishonest behavior is insignificant at aggregate level. However, further analysis of individual data shows that symmetric externalities decrease probability of dishonest reporting if dishonesty is advantageous. We observe no significant effect of third-party punishment on reporting behavior of subjects both at individual level and aggregate level. Moreover, our findings suggest that when both of the group members report dishonestly to their advantage, third parties impose more punishment in no symmetric externality treatment than symmetric externality treatment.