The Curious Incident of Indistinguishable Selves A Reply to Nesic


DAVOODY BENI M.

INTERNATIONAL STUDIES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE, 2022 (AHCI) identifier

  • Publication Type: Article / Article
  • Publication Date: 2022
  • Doi Number: 10.1080/02698595.2022.2153215
  • Journal Name: INTERNATIONAL STUDIES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
  • Journal Indexes: Arts and Humanities Citation Index (AHCI), Academic Search Premier, IBZ Online, International Bibliography of Social Sciences, Periodicals Index Online, Agricultural & Environmental Science Database, Educational research abstracts (ERA), Philosopher's Index, Religion and Philosophy Collection, zbMATH
  • Middle East Technical University Affiliated: Yes

Abstract

This is a short discussion of Janko Nesic's [2022. "Towards a Neutral-Structuralist Theory of Consciousness and Selfhood." International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 1-17], which conveys a critical review of Beni's Structural Realist theory of the Self (SRS). Nesic's critique indicates that there is an incongruity between the structuralist tendency of SRS and its commitment to panpsychism. He argues that Beni can use the notion of internal information to develop a more congenial account of consciousness than panpsychism. In this paper, I defend the panpsychist component of Beni's theory and explain why I think it's preferable to Nesic's proposal.