INTERNATIONAL STUDIES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE, sa.3-4, ss.261-268, 2022 (AHCI)
This is a short discussion of Janko Nesic's [2022. "Towards a Neutral-Structuralist Theory of Consciousness and Selfhood." International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 1-17], which conveys a critical review of Beni's Structural Realist theory of the Self (SRS). Nesic's critique indicates that there is an incongruity between the structuralist tendency of SRS and its commitment to panpsychism. He argues that Beni can use the notion of internal information to develop a more congenial account of consciousness than panpsychism. In this paper, I defend the panpsychist component of Beni's theory and explain why I think it's preferable to Nesic's proposal.