Implementation of the Core in College Admissions Problems When Colleagues Matter


Kucuksenel S.

B E JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL ECONOMICS, cilt.11, 2011 (SSCI İndekslerine Giren Dergi) identifier identifier

  • Cilt numarası: 11 Konu: 1
  • Basım Tarihi: 2011
  • Doi Numarası: 10.2202/1935-1704.1772
  • Dergi Adı: B E JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL ECONOMICS

Özet

This paper presents mechanisms implementing the core correspondence of many-to-one matching markets, such as college admissions problems, where the students have preferences over the other students who would attend the same college. We first present a sequential mechanism implementing the core. We then show that simple two-stage mechanisms, which mimics the real-life processes, cannot be used to implement the core correspondence in subgame perfect Nash equilibrium even with strong assumptions on agents' preferences.