Implementation of the Core in College Admissions Problems When Colleagues Matter
B E JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL ECONOMICS, cilt.11, sa.1, 2011 (SSCI, Scopus)
- Yayın Türü: Makale / Tam Makale
- Cilt numarası: 11 Sayı: 1
- Basım Tarihi: 2011
- Doi Numarası: 10.2202/1935-1704.1772
- Dergi Adı: B E JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
- Derginin Tarandığı İndeksler: Social Sciences Citation Index (SSCI), Scopus
- Anahtar Kelimeler: college admissions problem, core, implementation, MARKET, PREFERENCES, STABILITY
- Orta Doğu Teknik Üniversitesi Adresli: Evet
Özet
This paper presents mechanisms implementing the core correspondence of many-to-one matching markets, such as college admissions problems, where the students have preferences over the other students who would attend the same college. We first present a sequential mechanism implementing the core. We then show that simple two-stage mechanisms, which mimics the real-life processes, cannot be used to implement the core correspondence in subgame perfect Nash equilibrium even with strong assumptions on agents' preferences.