Implementation of the Core in College Admissions Problems When Colleagues Matter

Kucuksenel S.

B E JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL ECONOMICS, vol.11, no.1, 2011 (SSCI) identifier identifier

  • Publication Type: Article / Article
  • Volume: 11 Issue: 1
  • Publication Date: 2011
  • Doi Number: 10.2202/1935-1704.1772
  • Journal Name: B E JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
  • Journal Indexes: Social Sciences Citation Index (SSCI), Scopus
  • Keywords: college admissions problem, core, implementation, MARKET, PREFERENCES, STABILITY
  • Middle East Technical University Affiliated: Yes

Abstract

This paper presents mechanisms implementing the core correspondence of many-to-one matching markets, such as college admissions problems, where the students have preferences over the other students who would attend the same college. We first present a sequential mechanism implementing the core. We then show that simple two-stage mechanisms, which mimics the real-life processes, cannot be used to implement the core correspondence in subgame perfect Nash equilibrium even with strong assumptions on agents' preferences.