Interim efficient auctions with interdependent valuations

Kucuksenel S.

JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, vol.106, no.1, pp.83-93, 2012 (SSCI) identifier identifier

  • Publication Type: Article / Article
  • Volume: 106 Issue: 1
  • Publication Date: 2012
  • Doi Number: 10.1007/s00712-011-0226-8
  • Journal Name: JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
  • Journal Indexes: Social Sciences Citation Index (SSCI), Scopus
  • Page Numbers: pp.83-93
  • Keywords: Auctions, Interdependent values, Incentive efficiency, MECHANISM DESIGN, PARTNERSHIPS, PRINCIPAL
  • Middle East Technical University Affiliated: Yes

Abstract

We provide a characterization of interim efficient auctions and examine their properties in the presence of informational interdependent valuations. We show that buyers can be awarded the auctioned item less often than the efficient level. We also show that buyers obtain the item more often as the degree of heterogeneity in preferences increases, even though profitability of trade does not depend on the heterogeneity in preferences.