Interim efficient auctions with interdependent valuations


Kucuksenel S.

JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, cilt.106, ss.83-93, 2012 (SSCI İndekslerine Giren Dergi) identifier identifier

  • Cilt numarası: 106 Konu: 1
  • Basım Tarihi: 2012
  • Doi Numarası: 10.1007/s00712-011-0226-8
  • Dergi Adı: JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
  • Sayfa Sayıları: ss.83-93

Özet

We provide a characterization of interim efficient auctions and examine their properties in the presence of informational interdependent valuations. We show that buyers can be awarded the auctioned item less often than the efficient level. We also show that buyers obtain the item more often as the degree of heterogeneity in preferences increases, even though profitability of trade does not depend on the heterogeneity in preferences.