Interim efficient auctions with interdependent valuations

Kucuksenel S.

JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, cilt.106, sa.1, ss.83-93, 2012 (SSCI) identifier identifier

  • Yayın Türü: Makale / Tam Makale
  • Cilt numarası: 106 Sayı: 1
  • Basım Tarihi: 2012
  • Doi Numarası: 10.1007/s00712-011-0226-8
  • Dergi Adı: JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
  • Derginin Tarandığı İndeksler: Social Sciences Citation Index (SSCI), Scopus
  • Sayfa Sayıları: ss.83-93
  • Anahtar Kelimeler: Auctions, Interdependent values, Incentive efficiency, MECHANISM DESIGN, PARTNERSHIPS, PRINCIPAL
  • Orta Doğu Teknik Üniversitesi Adresli: Evet

Özet

We provide a characterization of interim efficient auctions and examine their properties in the presence of informational interdependent valuations. We show that buyers can be awarded the auctioned item less often than the efficient level. We also show that buyers obtain the item more often as the degree of heterogeneity in preferences increases, even though profitability of trade does not depend on the heterogeneity in preferences.