ELECTORAL SYSTEMS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE POLICY


KÜÇÜKŞENEL S., GÜLSEVEN O.

ACTUAL PROBLEMS OF ECONOMICS, no.121, pp.367-371, 2011 (Peer-Reviewed Journal) identifier identifier

  • Publication Type: Article / Article
  • Publication Date: 2011
  • Journal Name: ACTUAL PROBLEMS OF ECONOMICS
  • Journal Indexes: Social Sciences Citation Index, Scopus
  • Page Numbers: pp.367-371

Abstract

We develop a simple theoretic game a model to analyze the relationship between electoral systems and governments' choice in trade policies. We show that existence of international pressure or. foreign lobby changes a government's final decision on trade policy, and trade policy in countries with proportional electoral system is more protectionist than in countries with majoritarian electoral system. Moreover, lobbies pay more to affect the trade policy outcomes in countries with proportional representation systems.