Ownership premia and optimal k-double auctions


Genç H., Küçükşenel S.

ECONOMICS LETTERS, cilt.270, ss.1-4, 2027 (SSCI, Scopus)

  • Yayın Türü: Makale / Tam Makale
  • Cilt numarası: 270
  • Basım Tarihi: 2027
  • Doi Numarası: 10.1016/j.econlet.2026.113352
  • Dergi Adı: ECONOMICS LETTERS
  • Derginin Tarandığı İndeksler: Business Source Ultimate (EBSCO), Scopus, Social Sciences Citation Index (SSCI), Periodicals Index Online, ABI/INFORM, EconLit, MathSciNet, Public Affairs Index, zbMATH
  • Sayfa Sayıları: ss.1-4
  • Orta Doğu Teknik Üniversitesi Adresli: Evet

Özet

This study examines optimal k-double auctions with ownership premia. We consider independent, uniformly distributed material values and an affine premium fixed across mechanisms. We show that k=1/2 remains optimal if the premium is constant or included in welfare. On the other hand, if the premium increases with the seller’s material value and is excluded from welfare, the optimum becomes k<1/2. It generates fewer trades but higher expected material gains. The selected linear equilibrium attains the second-best for material gains among Bayesian incentive-compatible, interim individually rational, and ex-ante budget-balanced mechanisms.