BONJOUR'S INTERNALIST FOUNDATIONALISM AND EPISTEMIC VIRTUES

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Karaca K.

FILOZOFIA, cilt.78, sa.2, ss.77-85, 2023 (AHCI, Scopus)

  • Yayın Türü: Makale / Tam Makale
  • Cilt numarası: 78 Sayı: 2
  • Basım Tarihi: 2023
  • Doi Numarası: 10.31577/filozofia.2023.78.2.1
  • Dergi Adı: FILOZOFIA
  • Derginin Tarandığı İndeksler: Arts and Humanities Citation Index (AHCI), Scopus
  • Sayfa Sayıları: ss.77-85
  • Açık Arşiv Koleksiyonu: AVESİS Açık Erişim Koleksiyonu
  • Orta Doğu Teknik Üniversitesi Adresli: Evet

Özet

BonJour's argumentative strategy underlying his account of internalist empirical foundationalism posits a descriptive relation between an empirical belief and the corresponding sensory experience. I argue that his argumentative strategy makes it necessary to appeal to epistemic virtues, such as accuracy, simplicity and co-herency, for the epistemic assessment of the foregoing relation. I also argue that the relevance of epistemic virtues to this assessment is due to what I call back-ground beliefs in one's belief-system. I thus conclude that BonJour's argumen-tative strategy is misguided in the sense that it overlooks the role of background beliefs in the assessment of empirical beliefs in terms of epistemic virtues, mean-ing that there can be no basic empirical beliefs in the way suggested by BonJour.