Akademik Veri Yönetim Sistemi
6th Politics and International Relations Congress, Trabzon, Türkiye, 18 Ekim - 21 Kasım 2023, ss.119-121
“THE GENTLEMEN’S AGREEMENT” BETWEEN
VLADIMIR PUTIN AND THE KADYROV FAMILY:
HOW HAVE SOME CHECHEN FIGHTERS BECOME A
PART OF RUSSIAN MILITARY OPERATIONS?
Mehmet İlbey Çoban / ODTÜ
Taha Kalaycı / ODTÜ
Abstract
Apart from the Russian Army and Wagner Group, one of the
most important weapons of Russian President Vladimir Putin in
the Russia-Ukraine war that started in February 2022 and in its
operations in Syria since 2015 was the Chechen forces.
Nevertheless, in the 1990s after the collapse of the Soviet Union,
there were two major Russian-Chechen wars. As soon as
Vladimir Putin became prime minister in 1999, his most crucial
action was to end major Chechen insurgency in 1999. It is argued
that the first Chechen War -started by the Chechen Republic of
Ichkeria (which has been autonomous to some degree) against
the Russian Federation (1994-1996)- took place in order to gain
independence. While the First Chechen War was carried out by
nationalist sentiments to a higher degree, the Second Chechen
War was on the grounds of more Islamist sentiments.
Nonetheless, when some Chechen Islamist fighters infiltrated
illegally and attacked the Dagestan region in 1999, Russian forces
carried out operations to restore order in the region. So far there
were no major Chechen insurgency (apart from some events
initiated by some radical Chechens which were considered as
low-insurgency until 2017) after the second Chechen war which
lasted until 2009. However, after the war ended in 2009, some
terrorist attacks occurred in Russia (in the years 2010 and 2011)
by the “North Caucasus Emirate” (which was founded in 2007).
It should also be remembered that the Syrian Civil War also
caused the spill-over threat of radicalism beyond the borders.
Nevertheless, some Chechen jihadist fighters also demonstrated
their allegiance to ISIS terrorist organization in Syria.
Considering those events, Chechen radicalism has been
perceived as a threat to stability and order in Russian Federation.
On the other hand, Chechen fighters have been also a useful
instrument for Russian military operations. So how did Putin
manage to utilize Chechen fighters to fight alongside Russia?
What are the main parameters for this phenomenon? And finally
are these relations with the Russian military and Chechen
fighters sustainable considering the latest revolt initiated by the
Wagner Group?
The personal relations between the Chechen Kadyrov family and
Putin are important determinants in analyzing the Chechen
support to the Russian army. Nevertheless, Akhmad Kadyrov
who was one of the main leading figures in Chechen separatism
switched sides and declared its support to Russian federal forces
during the Second Chechen War in 1999. And following his death
in 2004, his son Ramzan Kadyrov has become a more apparent
figure and assumed office as the Head of the Chechen Republic
in 2007. In their win-win relations, the Kadyrov family has
established and maintained ostensibly economic wealth (to some
degree) and effective rule against their domestic opposition in
the Republic as well as gained more autonomy to a degree in the
Federation (even Moscow subsidized the Chechen economy in
favor of Kadyrovs); while Russian central leadership manages to
passivate the centrifugal insurgency. Nevertheless, this situation
is based on a gentleman's agreement between Putin and Kadyrov
and has not been fully institutionalized. As a matter of fact,
during the Russo-Ukraine war, Kadyrov has not abstained from
criticizing the Russian Defence Ministry and the management of
the war situation. For instance, he opposed the plan of
September 2022 (conducted also by the Russian Ministry of
Defence) regarding the exchange of prisoners of war during the
Russo-Ukraine war. In fact, he advocates harsher methods (such
as utilizing nuclear weapons against Ukraine) in the
management of the war. Do these kinds of discourses also
represent the sought-for maneuver in the political scene against
central authority while seemingly channeling his opposition to
Russian Minister of Defence Sergei Shoigu? Why do Chechen
fighters under Kadyrov support the Russian Army? Those
questions will lead us to understand the Chechen fighters in the
Russian military operations and their relations with the central
authority.
In this research, our main question is: How have Chechen
fighters become a part of Russian military operations?
To answer this question, firstly the historical panorama
concerning Chechnya’s status vis-a-vis the Russian Soviet
Federative Socialist Republic’s central power will be given very
shortly. Secondly, the collapse of the USSR in 1991 and its impact
on Chechnya and the First Chechen War will be discussed. While
there are some differences between the first and the second
Chechen Wars, those differences might also determine the
establishment of relations between the Kadyrov family and
Putin. Thus, assessing those differences may provide invaluable
clues concerning this research. Finally, the main determinants
of the Chechen fighters (mainly Kadyrovites) in the Russian
military will be analyzed accordingly.
Keywords: Chechen Fighters, Relations between Vladimir
Putin and Ramzan Kadyrov, Russian Military Operations, Russo-
Ukraine War, Politics of Chechnya