The role of intermediaries in corruption

Bayar G.

PUBLIC CHOICE, vol.122, pp.277-298, 2005 (SSCI) identifier identifier

  • Publication Type: Article / Article
  • Volume: 122
  • Publication Date: 2005
  • Doi Number: 10.1007/s11127-005-5916-8
  • Journal Name: PUBLIC CHOICE
  • Journal Indexes: Social Sciences Citation Index (SSCI), Scopus
  • Page Numbers: pp.277-298
  • Middle East Technical University Affiliated: No

Abstract

The aim of the article is to examine a briber initiated corrupt transaction and the role of intermediaries in such a transaction, using a game theoretical model. Clients applying the intermediaries do so to be able to get rid of high red tape applied by the officers. They prefer using intermediary instead of offering a bribe to the officers directly since they do not know which officers are corrupt (accepts a bribe offer) and how much bribe should be given to the corrupt officers.