What Does Bonjour’s Empirical Foundationalism (Unwittingly) Inherit from Carnap’s and Schlick’s Verificationism?

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Karaca K.

FILOZOFIA NAUKI, cilt.1, sa.1, ss.1-22, 2024 (Hakemli Dergi)

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I compare and contrast BonJour’s account of empirical foundationalism with Carnap’s and Schlick’s accounts of verificationism, the debate over which was a hallmark of the logical empiricist movement. I argue that the essential aspects of BonJour’s account bear a close resemblance to different aspects of Carnap’s and Schlick’s accounts, while there are important differences among these accounts. As I show, these aspects concern the kind of relation that exists between a basic empirical belief and the corresponding sensory experience, and the way in which the former is justified by appeal to the latter. The present paper thus illustrates how the debates that took place within the logical empiricist movement are still relevant to contemporary issues in epistemology.