Value of supplier's capacity information in a two-echelon supply chain

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BAKAL İ. S., ERKİP N. K., GÜLLÜ A. R.

ANNALS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH, cilt.191, sa.1, ss.115-135, 2011 (SCI-Expanded) identifier identifier

  • Yayın Türü: Makale / Tam Makale
  • Cilt numarası: 191 Sayı: 1
  • Basım Tarihi: 2011
  • Doi Numarası: 10.1007/s10479-011-0937-9
  • Dergi Adı: ANNALS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH
  • Derginin Tarandığı İndeksler: Science Citation Index Expanded (SCI-EXPANDED), Scopus
  • Sayfa Sayıları: ss.115-135
  • Anahtar Kelimeler: Value of information, Limited capacity, Rationing game, ASYMMETRIC-INFORMATION, COST INFORMATION, CONTRACTS, MARKET, POLICY
  • Orta Doğu Teknik Üniversitesi Adresli: Evet

Özet

In traditional supply chain models it is generally assumed that full information is available to all parties involved. Although this seems reasonable, there are cases where chain members are independent agents and possess different levels of information. In this study, we analyze a two-echelon, single supplier-multiple retailers supply chain in a single-period setting where the capacity of the supplier is limited. Embedding the lack of information about the capacity of the supplier in the model, we aim to analyze the reaction of the retailers, compare it with the full-information case, and assess the value of information and the effects of information asymmetry using game theoretic analysis. In our numerical studies, we conclude that the value of information is highly dependent on the capacity conditions and estimates of the retailers, and having information is not necessarily beneficial to the retailers.