A two-tiered cognitive architecture for moral reasoning

Bolender J.

BIOLOGY & PHILOSOPHY, cilt.16, ss.339-356, 2001 (SCI İndekslerine Giren Dergi) identifier identifier

  • Cilt numarası: 16 Konu: 3
  • Basım Tarihi: 2001
  • Doi Numarası: 10.1023/a:1010663018267
  • Sayfa Sayıları: ss.339-356


The view that moral cognition is subserved by a two-tiered architecture is defended: Moral reasoning is the result both of specialized, informationally encapsulated modules which automatically and effortlessly generate intuitions; and of general-purpose, cognitively penetrable mechanisms which enable moral judgment in the light of the agent's general fund of knowledge. This view is contrasted with rival architectures of social/moral cognition, such as Cosmides and Tooby's view that the mind is wholly modular, and it is argued that a two-tiered architecture is more plausible.