Dynamic Signaling Games under Nash and Stackelberg Equilibria

Creative Commons License

Saritas S., Yuksel S., Gezici S.

IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT), Barcelona, Spain, 10 - 15 July 2016, pp.1631-1635 identifier identifier

  • Publication Type: Conference Paper / Full Text
  • Doi Number: 10.1109/isit.2016.7541575
  • City: Barcelona
  • Country: Spain
  • Page Numbers: pp.1631-1635
  • Middle East Technical University Affiliated: No


In this study, dynamic and repeated quadratic cheap talk and signaling game problems are investigated. These involve encoder and decoders with mismatched performance objectives, where the encoder has a bias term in the quadratic cost functional. We consider both Nash equilibria and Stackelberg equilibria as our solution concepts, under a perfect Bayesian formulation. These two lead to drastically different characteristics for the equilibria. For the cheap talk problem under Nash equilibria, we show that fully revealing equilibria cannot exist and the final state equilibria have to be quantized for a large class of source models; whereas, for the Stackelberg case, the equilibria must be fully revealing regardless of the source model. In the dynamic signaling game where the transmission of a Gaussian source over a Gaussian channel is considered, the equilibrium policies are always linear for scalar sources under Stackelberg equilibria, and affine policies constitute an invariant subspace under best response maps for Nash equilibria.