Akademik Veri Yönetim Sistemi
Southern Journal of Philosophy, cilt.61, sa.4, ss.638-654, 2023 (AHCI)
Deleuze never explicitly formulates his philosophy of logical truth-values. It thus remains an open question as to the number and types he held there to be. Despite his explicit comments on these matters, additional textual evidence suggests that in his thinking on the event, he favored a third truth-value, holding either the analetheic view that some truth-bearers can be truth-valueless or the dialetheic view that some truth-bearers can be both true and false. I first argue that taking a logical approach to Deleuze's thinking is feasible, despite his and others' claims that might suggest otherwise. Next, I examine his explicit statements to show that they cannot be taken at face value and that, rather, we need to transpose his claims into contemporary terminology in order to accurately assess them. I lastly turn to his Leibniz-inspired philosophy of time to argue that the affirmations involved in this conception strongly suggest a dialetheic tendency in his thinking.