Is the Theistic Understanding of Immortal Life Preferable?


Fettahoglu S., Arkan A.

BEYTULHIKME-AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, vol.16, no.2, pp.773-784, 2026 (ESCI, TRDizin)

  • Publication Type: Article / Article
  • Volume: 16 Issue: 2
  • Publication Date: 2026
  • Doi Number: 10.29228/beytulhikme.90444
  • Journal Name: BEYTULHIKME-AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
  • Journal Indexes: Emerging Sources Citation Index (ESCI), Central & Eastern European Academic Source (CEEAS), Index Islamicus, Philosopher's Index, TR DİZİN (ULAKBİM), Philosopher's Index full-text
  • Page Numbers: pp.773-784
  • Middle East Technical University Affiliated: No

Abstract

Islam offers heaven to those who have faith and do good deeds on Earth. However, there are problems with the preferability of an immortal afterlife, as Bernard Williams argues. Immortal life can be boring, one may not maintain her identity for such a long time, or the life may not be recognizable as a human life. The problem lies in the categorical desires. If categorical desires - the desires that motivate us to live- change over time, one cannot remain the same person throughout time. If, however, the desires do not change, the life cannot be recognizable as a human life. We claim that al-F & amacr;r & amacr;b & imacr;'s approach can help us to sidestep this challenge, compatible with an Islamic perspective. al-F & amacr;r & amacr;b & imacr; thinks that a moral life is required for happiness. We suggest that moral life is an unchanging categorical desire, but the ways of satisfying this categorical desire can change.