On the ontology of linguistic frameworks toward a comprehensive version of empiricism


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DAVOODY BENI M.

Philosophia Scientiae, vol.19, no.1, pp.115-126, 2015 (Peer-Reviewed Journal) identifier

  • Publication Type: Article / Abstract
  • Volume: 19 Issue: 1
  • Publication Date: 2015
  • Doi Number: 10.4000/philosophiascientiae.1044
  • Journal Name: Philosophia Scientiae
  • Journal Indexes: Scopus, Philosopher's Index, zbMATH
  • Page Numbers: pp.115-126

Abstract

Can the abstract entities be designated ? While the empiricists usually took the positive answer to this question as the first step toward Platonism, in his "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology" [Carnap 1950], Carnap tried to make a reconciliation between the language referring to abstract entities on the one hand, and empiricism on the other. In this paper, firstly, I show that the ingenuity of Carnap's approach notwithstanding, it is prone to criticism from different aspects. But I also show how, even without leaving the empiricist research program, the shortcomings could be amended. Following Carnap's 1950 outset, and adding some apparently untasteful (Meinongian) ingredients, I will sketch a refined way for dealing with the problem of existence of abstract entities within the framework of the philosophy of empiricism.