Akademik Veri Yönetim Sistemi
PHILOSOPHIA-INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, cilt.18, sa.2, ss.141-157, 2017 (AHCI)
The perennial problem of the exact nature of epistemic justification has recently become even more interesting upon Laurence Bon Jour's openly converting himself to foundationalism following a long and successful career built mainly around a strong defense of coherentism cum internalism. Even though the famous debate between foundationalism and coherentism is often associated with the "technical" issues of epistemic regress, basic beliefs, and so on, in this paper I will approach the debate from the standpoint of the post-Wittgensteinian literature and try to provide some useful insights about the justification of those beliefs alleged by the foundationalist to constitute our ultimate touch with reality. More specifically, I will offer a neo-Kantian interpretation of the subvenient basis of supervenience relations believed to take place between the world and our basic cognitive states, and claim that such an approach has a better chance of combining the strengths of the traditional rivals in epistemology and coming up with a viable synthesis on this matter.