An Axiomatization of the Interval Shapley Value and on Some Interval Solution Concepts

PALANCI O., ALPARSLAN GÖK S. Z., Weber G.

8th International Conference on Game Theory and Management, St Petersburg, Rusya, 25 - 27 Haziran 2014, cilt.8, ss.243-251 identifier

  • Yayın Türü: Bildiri / Tam Metin Bildiri
  • Cilt numarası: 8
  • Basıldığı Şehir: St Petersburg
  • Basıldığı Ülke: Rusya
  • Sayfa Sayıları: ss.243-251
  • Anahtar Kelimeler: Shapley value, Banzhaf value, egalitarian rule, interval uncertainty, fairness property
  • Orta Doğu Teknik Üniversitesi Adresli: Evet

Özet

The Shapley value, one of the most common solution concepts in Operations Research applications of cooperative game theory, is defined and axiomatically characterized in different game-theoretical models. In this paper, we focus on the Shapley value for cooperative games where the set of players is finite and the coalition values are compact intervals of real numbers. In this study, we study the properties of the interval Shapley value on the class of size monotonic interval games, and axiomatically characterize its restriction to a special subclass of cooperative interval games by using fairness property, efficiency and the null player property. Further, we introduce the interval Banzhaf value and the interval egalitarian rule. Finally, the paper ends with a conclusion and an outlook to future studies.