Competitive newsvendor problems with the same Nash and Stackelberg solutions

Serin Y. Y.

OPERATIONS RESEARCH LETTERS, vol.35, no.1, pp.83-94, 2007 (SCI-Expanded) identifier identifier

  • Publication Type: Article / Article
  • Volume: 35 Issue: 1
  • Publication Date: 2007
  • Doi Number: 10.1016/j.orl.2006.01.002
  • Journal Name: OPERATIONS RESEARCH LETTERS
  • Journal Indexes: Science Citation Index Expanded (SCI-EXPANDED), Scopus
  • Page Numbers: pp.83-94
  • Keywords: competitive newsvendor problem, Nash equilibrium, Stackelberg game
  • Middle East Technical University Affiliated: Yes

Abstract

Consider two newsvendors: (i) they compete satisfying substitutable demands searching Nash equilibrium or (ii) one is the leader deciding first, the other responds optimally playing a Stackelberg game. The leader profits more than she does in (i). We present conditions under which the leader's profit does not improve from (i) to (ii). (c) 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.