Competitive newsvendor problems with the same Nash and Stackelberg solutions


Serin Y. Y.

OPERATIONS RESEARCH LETTERS, vol.35, no.1, pp.83-94, 2007 (Journal Indexed in SCI) identifier identifier

  • Publication Type: Article / Article
  • Volume: 35 Issue: 1
  • Publication Date: 2007
  • Doi Number: 10.1016/j.orl.2006.01.002
  • Title of Journal : OPERATIONS RESEARCH LETTERS
  • Page Numbers: pp.83-94

Abstract

Consider two newsvendors: (i) they compete satisfying substitutable demands searching Nash equilibrium or (ii) one is the leader deciding first, the other responds optimally playing a Stackelberg game. The leader profits more than she does in (i). We present conditions under which the leader's profit does not improve from (i) to (ii). (c) 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.