THE WELFARISTIC CHARACTERIZATION OF 2-PERSON REVELATION EQUILIBRIA UNDER IMPUTATIONAL GOVERNMENT

KORAY S., SERTEL M.

SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE, cilt.9, sa.1, ss.49-56, 1992 (SSCI) identifier

  • Yayın Türü: Makale / Tam Makale
  • Cilt numarası: 9 Sayı: 1
  • Basım Tarihi: 1992
  • Dergi Adı: SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE
  • Derginin Tarandığı İndeksler: Social Sciences Citation Index (SSCI), Scopus
  • Sayfa Sayıları: ss.49-56
  • Orta Doğu Teknik Üniversitesi Adresli: Hayır

Özet

Given two players whose declarations about their private preferences are to be used in enforcing imputations, i.e. individually rational Pareto optima according to the declared preference profile, the Nash equilibria of the revelation game so defined always induce individually rational outcomes according to the true preferences, and for all such outcomes there is (and we construct) a Nash equilibrium declaration of preferences which induces precisely that outcome.