THE WELFARISTIC CHARACTERIZATION OF 2-PERSON REVELATION EQUILIBRIA UNDER IMPUTATIONAL GOVERNMENT


KORAY S., SERTEL M.

SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE, cilt.9, ss.49-56, 1992 (SSCI İndekslerine Giren Dergi) identifier

  • Cilt numarası: 9 Konu: 1
  • Basım Tarihi: 1992
  • Dergi Adı: SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE
  • Sayfa Sayıları: ss.49-56

Özet

Given two players whose declarations about their private preferences are to be used in enforcing imputations, i.e. individually rational Pareto optima according to the declared preference profile, the Nash equilibria of the revelation game so defined always induce individually rational outcomes according to the true preferences, and for all such outcomes there is (and we construct) a Nash equilibrium declaration of preferences which induces precisely that outcome.