THE WELFARISTIC CHARACTERIZATION OF 2-PERSON REVELATION EQUILIBRIA UNDER IMPUTATIONAL GOVERNMENT

KORAY S., SERTEL M.

SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE, vol.9, no.1, pp.49-56, 1992 (SSCI) identifier

  • Publication Type: Article / Article
  • Volume: 9 Issue: 1
  • Publication Date: 1992
  • Journal Name: SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE
  • Journal Indexes: Social Sciences Citation Index (SSCI), Scopus
  • Page Numbers: pp.49-56
  • Middle East Technical University Affiliated: No

Abstract

Given two players whose declarations about their private preferences are to be used in enforcing imputations, i.e. individually rational Pareto optima according to the declared preference profile, the Nash equilibria of the revelation game so defined always induce individually rational outcomes according to the true preferences, and for all such outcomes there is (and we construct) a Nash equilibrium declaration of preferences which induces precisely that outcome.