Knowing Wrongly: An Obvious Oxymoron, or a Threat for the Alleged Universality of Epistemological Analyses?

Bac M. M., Irmak N.

CROATIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, cilt.11, sa.33, ss.305-321, 2011 (AHCI) identifier identifier

  • Yayın Türü: Makale / Tam Makale
  • Cilt numarası: 11 Sayı: 33
  • Basım Tarihi: 2011
  • Dergi Adı: CROATIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
  • Derginin Tarandığı İndeksler: Arts and Humanities Citation Index (AHCI), Scopus
  • Sayfa Sayıları: ss.305-321
  • Orta Doğu Teknik Üniversitesi Adresli: Hayır

Özet

The traditional tripartite and tetrapartite analyses describe the conceptual components of propositional knowledge from a universal epistemic point of view. According to the classical analysis, since truth is a necessary condition of knowledge, it does not snake sense to talk about "false knowledge" or "knowing wrongly." There are nonetheless some natural languages in which speakers ordinarily make statements about a person's knowing a given subject matter wrongly. In this paper, we first provide a brief analysis of "knowing wrongly" in Turkish. Then, taking Allan Hazlett's recent account of the gap between traditional analyses of knowledge and actual epistemic practices of real cognitive agents as a point of departure, we spell out a non-universalist and non-extensionalist perspective on the value of "knowing wrongly."