Knowing Wrongly: An Obvious Oxymoron, or a Threat for the Alleged Universality of Epistemological Analyses?


Bac M. M. , Irmak N.

CROATIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, vol.11, no.33, pp.305-321, 2011 (Peer-Reviewed Journal) identifier identifier

  • Publication Type: Article / Article
  • Volume: 11 Issue: 33
  • Publication Date: 2011
  • Journal Name: CROATIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
  • Journal Indexes: Arts and Humanities Citation Index, Scopus
  • Page Numbers: pp.305-321

Abstract

The traditional tripartite and tetrapartite analyses describe the conceptual components of propositional knowledge from a universal epistemic point of view. According to the classical analysis, since truth is a necessary condition of knowledge, it does not snake sense to talk about "false knowledge" or "knowing wrongly." There are nonetheless some natural languages in which speakers ordinarily make statements about a person's knowing a given subject matter wrongly. In this paper, we first provide a brief analysis of "knowing wrongly" in Turkish. Then, taking Allan Hazlett's recent account of the gap between traditional analyses of knowledge and actual epistemic practices of real cognitive agents as a point of departure, we spell out a non-universalist and non-extensionalist perspective on the value of "knowing wrongly."