A Structuralist Defence of the Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness


DAVOODY BENI M.

JOURNAL OF CONSCIOUSNESS STUDIES, vol.25, no.9-10, pp.75-98, 2018 (Journal Indexed in SSCI) identifier identifier

  • Publication Type: Article / Article
  • Volume: 25 Issue: 9-10
  • Publication Date: 2018
  • Title of Journal : JOURNAL OF CONSCIOUSNESS STUDIES
  • Page Numbers: pp.75-98

Abstract

This paper addresses John Searle's criticism of the integrated information theory of consciousness (IITC for short). Among other things, Searle claimed that, since information is a syntactic notion, IITC cannot account for the content of consciousness. He also argued that IITC cannot explain consciousness in causal terms. In this paper, I demonstrate that the original formulation of IITC is compatible with a structuralist reading. After that, I explain how a structuralist reconstruction of IITC could deal with the objections that Searle raised. Among other things, I argue that IITC could provide genuine scientific explanations of consciousness, but the explanations are to be presented in structural, rather than causal, terms.