Core of the assignment game via fixed point methods
JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS, cilt.47, sa.1, ss.72-76, 2011 (SCI-Expanded, SSCI, Scopus)
- Yayın Türü: Makale / Tam Makale
- Cilt numarası: 47 Sayı: 1
- Basım Tarihi: 2011
- Doi Numarası: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2011.01.003
- Dergi Adı: JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS
- Derginin Tarandığı İndeksler: Science Citation Index Expanded (SCI-EXPANDED), Social Sciences Citation Index (SSCI), Scopus
- Sayfa Sayıları: ss.72-76
- Orta Doğu Teknik Üniversitesi Adresli: Evet
Özet
This paper shows that the core outcomes of the assignment game coincides with the set of fixed points of a certain function. The lattice property of the core, as well as its non-emptiness, are proved using Tarski's fixed point theorem. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.