Core of the assignment game via fixed point methods

Kucuksenel S.

JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS, cilt.47, sa.1, ss.72-76, 2011 (SCI-Expanded) identifier identifier

  • Yayın Türü: Makale / Tam Makale
  • Cilt numarası: 47 Sayı: 1
  • Basım Tarihi: 2011
  • Doi Numarası: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2011.01.003
  • Dergi Adı: JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS
  • Derginin Tarandığı İndeksler: Science Citation Index Expanded (SCI-EXPANDED), Social Sciences Citation Index (SSCI), Scopus
  • Sayfa Sayıları: ss.72-76
  • Orta Doğu Teknik Üniversitesi Adresli: Evet

Özet

This paper shows that the core outcomes of the assignment game coincides with the set of fixed points of a certain function. The lattice property of the core, as well as its non-emptiness, are proved using Tarski's fixed point theorem. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.