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MA Thesis

**“Local and National” Discourse; A Tool for the De-
Mobilization of Turkish Model**

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Table of Contents

Introduction	5
1. Analytical Framework.....	9
1.1. Theoretical Framework.....	9
1.2. Methodological Framework	10
2. Literature Review	13
2.1. Turkish Model in the Making.....	14
2.2. Homo-Islamicus.....	18
2.3. The Turkish Model	21
2.4. The Rise Authoritarianism and Turkish Islamism.....	27
2.5. “Local and National” Discourse	31
3. Discourse Analysis	35
3.1. “Local and National” "Production" Discourse	38
3.1.1. “Local and National” Production “Model”	41
3.1.2. The Contradictions Between “Local and National” Model and Neoliberalism.....	42
3.2. “Local and National” Discourses’ Political and Ideological Functions	44
3.3. “Local and National” “Identity”	48
Conclusion.....	53
Bibliography	57

Declaration of Authorship

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Abstract

This thesis analyses the variegated functions of the “local and national” discourse. It analyzes the rise of the de-mobilization of the "Turkish Model" and the historical bloc that emerged around the AKP as a central element in the “yerli ve milli” (i.e. “local and national”) discourse. It does so by focusing on the relationship between the state and business associations and how it produces the “local and national”.

This research contributes to the existing literature on rising authoritarianism and debates on identity in Turkey and how the “local and national” discourse was used as a tool for what can be analysed as a passive revolution. I conduct the thesis within a Gramscian conceptual framework. Discourse analysis allows this research to grasp the context of power relations between state and business associations.

The research mainly defines and analyzes three main aspects of the discourse, it first identifies the economic meaning of “local and national” production, it then moves to the ideological and political meaning of the discourse, and lastly, it analyses the discourse used as a “local and national” identity. This thesis argues that the “local and national” discourse is used for political and ideological purposes and the consolidation of an Islamic identity, which is a product of the organic relationship between the state and business association, namely MÜSİAD, rather than the actual emergence of a new “local and national” economic model. This thesis contend that the “local and national” discourse is a product of the organic crisis of the Turkish Model, which affected actors involved in the historical bloc, particularly TÜSİAD.

Introduction

Although the “local and national” discourse has occupied the Turkish political scene for a long time and regularly re-emerges whenever it serves the government's political agenda, it was commonly used between 2018 and 2020. Despite its pervasive presence in the public sphere, the term “local and national” remains a vague concept without a clear definition. One of the most common definitions of “local and national” production is to refer to a product designed, financed, and produced on Turkish soil by a Turkish company; therefore, the definition suggests an economic meaning. On the other hand, this definition does not involve the role of the state in this production model. The “economic” definition also does not cover other meanings of the discourse or the nature of the relationship between the state and business associations. This thesis does not merely cover the economic meaning of the “local and national” discourse. It also examines how the discourse becomes as an instrument to pursue, political and ideological objectives and enforcing an identity. This research focuses on two specific business associations: the first one is the Turkish Industry and Business Association (Türk Sanayicileri ve İş İnsanları Derneği-TÜSİAD), and the second one is Independent Industrialist and Businessmen Association (Müstakil Sanayici ve İş adamları Derneği-MÜSİAD). TÜSİAD is the oldest Business association in Turkey. They represent the biggest capitalist corporations of Turkey. MÜSİAD emerged as an alternative to TÜSİAD and they represent the Anatolian investors and small bourgeoisie. Their actions are widely influenced by Islam, even their understanding of capitalism is taunted by Islamic concepts. These associations are two of the largest business associations in Turkey, and therefore they are included in this research to identify the relationship between state and business associations, their influence in the making of the “local and national” discourse, and to clarify its political, economic, political-ideological, and enforcing an identity functions of the “local and national” discourse.

This thesis analyzes how the construction of the “local and national” discourse participated in the demobilization of the "Turkish model" by focusing on the relationship between the state and business associations. The research also identifies the transition process of the Turkish Model, The model was defined by Islamic liberalism and the historical bloc established around the Justice and Development Party (AKP), including both TÜSİAD and MÜSİAD, an era of to rising authoritarianism signaling an organic crisis. Existing studies on the Turkish Model and rising authoritarianism in Turkey, largely fail to examine the Model transformed from Islamic liberalism and free market to authoritarianism and the search for new economic policies. Especially since AKP's commitment to the EU membership process and economic and political partnership with the West in the last decade had many conflicts, but Turkish corporations are dependent on foreign investments and foreign business partners. What makes the “local and national” discourse unique is the confusion it creates: while creating a strategic autonomy discourse without sufficient industrial capability and antagonizing the West, AKP is still committed to neoliberal policies.

MÜSİAD saw the "Turkish Model" and democratization discourse it brought as a challenge to the center-periphery dichotomy. The dichotomy usually emerges with the definition of specific groups such as "secular elite," "Istanbul Bourgeoisie," in reference to TÜSİAD, as opposed to the "Anatolian Tigers," usually in reference to Islamist Small and medium-sized enterprises (SME), i.e. MÜSİAD. These differences started to be more visible in moments of crisis, especially after the 2008 crisis. The Turkish Model faced a crossroads, where the old bourgeoisie represented by TÜSİAD wanted to continue developing relations with the EU, which came with specific economic reforms on financialization and globalization; while MÜSİAD wanted to avoid premature de-industrialization. MÜSİAD, an association with SMEs at its core, demanded a different path towards globalization. It fosters a more Islam-oriented market and banking system compared to TÜSİAD's embeddedness

with western corporations. The conflict between the two associations drives from longstanding competition and fundamental ideological distinctions between two Business associations. Considering the history of unique relations between the state and the Bourgeoisie in Turkey, MÜSİAD seeks to be at the center of in the political decision-making processes as TÜSİAD once was before in the early years of the AKP era.

This research examines how the relationship between the state and business associations produces the discourse of “local and national” production? Why does such a dominant discourse benefit a particular group despite its minimal even inexistent economic effects? This thesis argues that the “local and national” production discourse is a tool for the demobilization the historical bloc. The “local and national” production became more of a product that serves the political goals and Islamic identity of the AKP and MÜSİAD without the ability to match the industrial capabilities of Turkey. The discourse is also used to capitalize on cross-class support based on populist nationalism. The politicization of the “local and national” discourse is also a challenge for the Turkish national identity, therefore the new identity of a Muslim nation enforced from the 1980s and continued by the AKP needs a Muslim “local and national” bourgeoisie.

This thesis argues that “local and national” discourse is used for political goals, agenda-setting, ideological purposes, and Islamic identity, which are products of the organic relationship between the state and business associations, rather than the emergence of a new economic model “local and national” production. This thesis also contends that the “local and national” discourse is a product of an organic crisis of the Turkish Model. The state developed a strategic autonomy discourse as a tool for the demobilization of the Model and the alliance it created around AKP.

This thesis contributes to the literature by analyzing a discursive tool used in this

transformation process, showing patterns of coercive actions and manufacturing consent, which is understudied within the existing literature. Therefore, it was criticized for its shortcomings such as its vague meaning and its unsustainable character considering the existing industrial infrastructure in Turkey. On the other hand, when the state could not create a sustainable economic model, “local and national” production discourse lost the word "production." When the word production was taken out of the concept, it became a political discourse and a matter of a new national identity that could be used to separate actors as "us and them." The thesis is a valuable tool for understanding the ongoing passive revolution and conflicts within the bourgeoisie.

The thesis consists of three parts. The first chapter introduces the thesis's analytical framework, which consists of the theoretical framework and methodology. Within the theoretical framework section, I explain how and why this thesis uses Gramsci's framework. In the Methodology section, the reader can find why discourse analysis was selected as the research methodology and the coding system this thesis uses.

The second chapter is the literature review, which consists of the historical background for the Turkish Model and how the model was constructed, and it introduces the actors that constitute the historical bloc, and then moves to definitions and analyses of the Turkish Model. It then examines the literature on the rise of authoritarianism and Turkish Islamism, and concludes with an analysis of the literature on “local and national” discourse.

The third chapter of the thesis is the discourse analysis, and in this part, the thesis introduces the research findings and discusses those findings. This chapter consists of three main parts, which are; “local and national” "Production" discourse," “local and national” Discourses' Political and Ideological Functions, "and “local and national” "Identity."

1. Analytical Framework

This section introduces the theoretical framework and methodology of the thesis. It works as an introduction to the concepts of Gramsci, which will be central to my discourse analysis. It also functions as an introduction to how the data is collected and analyzed within the methodology section. This section provides a justification for both the theoretical framework of Gramsci and the discourse analysis method used for the analysis of the data collected.

1.1. Theoretical Framework

This research uses from Gramsci's conceptual framework to understand the relationship between state and business associations. According to Savran (2014), Gramsci's concepts could be applied to distinctions between different classes, but they are also applicable to fractions within classes. The struggle to have the hegemony goes through also inner class conflicts. Gramsci's hegemony is a particular class's ability to construct an alliance with other classes. This term, however, does not just refer to economic leadership; it has different dimensions of leadership such as; cultural, moral, and ideological. The concept of historical bloc defines a consensus between different groups, which has to combine both superstructure and structure, the political sphere, and civil society. One political parties or class's hegemonic position depends on the existence of the historical bloc. Such as, in the case of Turkey, Türkeş (2016) gives the example of defining AKP as the center for the holy alliance, the early years of AKP is an example of how a historical bloc was established. Gramsci (2000, p.233) argues that,

...in the art of politics as happens in military art: war of movement increasingly becomes war of position and it can be said that a state will win a war in so far as it prepares for it minutely and technically in peacetime. The massive structures of the modern democracies, both as state organizations, and as complexes of associations in civil society, constitute for the art of politics as it were the 'trenches' and the permanent fortifications of the front in the war of position: they render merely 'partial' the element of manoeuvre which before used to be 'the whole' of war, etc.

For Gramsci (2000, p.431), the war of position serves “not only to designate a revolutionary strategy for the left but also to describe a phase of 'revolution reaction or passive revolution...

In this sense, fascism is also a form of war of position.” In the case of Turkey, the conflicts between two business associations and states involvement in the conflict can be identified as the war of position. More importantly, the transition or the fall of the Turkish Model and rising authoritarianism is the passive revolution. The AKP uses mobilize, demobilize strategy to the historical bloc emerged around the party, which is how Gramsci defines the concept of passive revolution. Another critical concept Gramsci identifies is the organic crisis. Gramsci (2000) identifies organic crises as;

One of its signs is when the traditional forms of political representation (parties or party leaders) are no longer recognized as adequate by the economic class or class fraction they had previously served to represent. It is, therefore, a crisis of hegemony since it occurs when a formerly hegemonic class is challenged from below and is no longer able to hold together a cohesive bloc of social alliances (p.427).

In the case of the AKP cohesive bloc crackdowns, as this paper indicates, are visible from the use of the “local and national” discourse. While it benefits some groups, it also aims to alienate former allies from political power as in the case of TÜSİAD and use of “local and national” discourse as a coercive tool against them.

1.2. Methodological Framework

This research uses a critical discourse analysis as a research method. The research question offers a critical perspective to state-business association relations in Turkey. While doing the literature review, focusing on these questions, there are some key themes for the research. This thesis argues that “local and national” discourse is a reflection of an organic crises caused by the global economic crises; with the crises in the core of the global economy the Turkish Model of development started to decline. The state developed a strategic autonomy discourse as a tool for the de-mobilization of the Model. The discourse aims to create a new identity and political goals to create cross-class support while empowering its allies, such as MÜSİAD.

Firstly, to understand the relationship between business associations and the state, the

literature on the "Turkish model" has vital importance to understand what is transforming. Polanyi (2007, p. 159), "Given a definite structure of society, the class theory works; but what if that structure itself undergoes a change?" Polanyi argues that without understanding the context of the change, a class analysis is not possible. To understand the context, one must first focus on society as a whole. Polanyi's approach is vital to understand the Turkish Model and contextualize the transformation of the Model.

Secondly, within the literature, there is also a rising interest in "rising authoritarianism in Turkey" after the fall of the Turkish Model. There are debates within the literature about the relationship between state-business association relations and between different business associations. Some critical researchers suggest there is no such difference within the bourgeoisie; on the contrary, the ones who argue that there is a conflict between these groups face the issue of how to distinguish these groups. Distinctions are usually made by group's attitudes towards secularism, size, or center-periphery dichotomy (Istanbul and Anatolia). Another challenge is how these conflicts should be defined. Some scholars define these as minor disagreements; others argue that this is a civil war or an ongoing passive revolution. Such contradictions within the literature indicates the blurry power relations between state and business associations in Turkey. This research offers to clarify the context of power relations between state and business associations, through a critical discourse analysis.

The focus of the discourse analysis is how this transformation happened; therefore, another key theme is "local and national". These themes are crucial for understanding the historical and socio-political context of the state-business associations. Various actors vaguely use the theme itself, but there is a sufficient amount of material just in the context of state-business relationships. The material is available in newspaper archives such as; Cumhuriyet, Anadolu Agency, T24, Sol News, Daily Sabah, Hürriyet, Birgün, British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) Turkish, Deutsche Welle Turkish, reports produced by business

associations such as; MÜSİAD's journal Çerçeve and TÜSİAD reports, and state archives, especially The Republic of Türkiye Directorate of Communications from 2015-2021. After gathering all the data, the thesis offers an analysis of the context of state-business association's relations, relating them to attributes, themes, and patterns relevant to state-business association relationships, while benefiting from Gramsci's theoretical framework.

The discourse analysis is crucial to understand how meaning is constructed, therefore as a method, it offers certain advantages while trying to understand vaguely used concepts in this case "local and national". Specifically, critical discourse analysis offers an approach to understanding language as a social practice. The critical discourse analysis is also used to understand power relations, especially to identify opaque relations between the actors and institutions. In the case of state-business association relations in Turkey, these relations are hard to define, as pointed out in the literature review part.

The thesis also uses MAXQDA in the discourse analysis part. Especially during the coding process of the data that was collected. The program offers auto coding for the words "local and national". While doing that, it also offers an opportunity to attach sub-codes by hand to be able to grasp the context; if "local and national" are used in the sense of their economic meaning, it usually tends to come together with the word "production," which is also one of the sub-codes used during the coding process. Another code used during this process was its "political and ideological" meaning. This meaning is understood with its collaboration with the word "stance," indicating a political position. There are also code words that might overlap but can be distinguished within the context, such as the word "model." The model was used in two different meanings; the first can be categorized under the economic meaning. MÜSİAD primarily uses this to demand an economic model based on "local and national" production; on the other hand, several state officials, ministers, and the president also used it to promote the presidency model; therefore, it is a political meaning. The last code applied to

the use of “local and national” was it is enforcing an "identity" function. This code was applied when the “local and national” is applied to a person, a group, or an institution. It also comes regarding Islamic morality to support or distinguish actors from others. The coding system helps understand the context of the speech or the document produced.

As the last step, the analyses of the material will be examined the function and meaning of the discourse used concerning power relations, and it will be concluded with a contextualization concerning the research question.

2. Literature Review

This literature review focuses on specific concepts, which could help identify the research question of this thesis. To be able to respond to such a question, the research focused on existing literature on "The Turkish Model," which is seen as a product of state and business relations collaborating with other partners to form a historical bloc. Under the title "in the making of the Turkish Model," the paper first aims to contextualize Turkey's state and business relations historically. This part is essential to understand power relations between the actors involved and how the "Turkish model" emerged. It also identifies what the Turkish Model inherits, challenges, and changes. In this part, another concept this paper focuses on is the Homo-Islamicus. This concept is vital to understanding how Islam and the free-market idea emerge. An Islamic interpretation was the essence of the idea of the Turkish Model. It was also crucial to understand under which conditions the Islamic bourgeoisie to join the historical bloc.

This thesis focuses on how the Turkish Model was constructed and described in the second part of the literature review. The Turkish Model was mainly used in the literature as an example of free-market and Islamic liberalism coming together within the international relations discipline. It was referenced to Turkey's soft power exercise in the Middle East and to the Muslim countries in its region. It was often identified as the economic success of

classical neo-liberalization applications such as rapid privatizations. Another point made about the Turkish Model was its effect on democratization in Turkey, especially EU reforms and AKP's commitment to the EU membership process. Economic growth and democratization were highly emphasized within the literature until the 2013 Gezi Parkı protest. However, the main focus in this part is the integral components and actors, which makes the Turkish Model. This part studies how the state mobilizes other actors by force and consent; therefore, it mainly focuses on power relations.

In the third part, the paper focuses on concepts such as rising authoritarianism, the fall of the Turkish Model, and democratic backsliding. After the Gezi Parkı protests, such concepts were widely used to describe AKP's government.

Concerning power relations between business associations and the state, there are conflicting approaches to relations between TÜSİAD and MÜSİAD. This part aims to identify such definitions of these relationships, such as; a civil war between different types of associations or compromising to sustain neo-liberal policies. This part also tries to identify sources, which tries to differentiate MÜSİAD and TÜSİAD with regards to their; size, place, or attitudes towards secularism and religion.

In the last section of the literature review, this paper tries to identify “local and national” discourse. This discourse was widely studied regarding the defense industry, but this part focuses on the studies that widely focus on its political meaning and historical background.

2.1. Turkish Model in the Making

Keyder (1987) argues that, with the Ottoman Empire starting to disintegrate, efforts create a national bourgeoisie emerged as the country started to be a part of the capitalist market. Unlike the core European countries, Turkish bureaucracy to create a new Turkish bourgeoisie under the etatism project, the coalition ensured economic growth with the opportunity to increase political control. Such a relationship creates a dependency relation

between the government and the business people. According to Buğra and Savaşkan (2014), the new government (Democrat Party) pressured Vehbi Koç, a businessperson committed to the Republican People's Party from the very beginning. The pressure aimed to establish similar relations with the business people, which they succeeded as Vehbi Koç quit the Republican Peoples Party to secure his business. Which is an indication of dependency between state and business people

According to Boratav (2005, p.40), after 1923 state aimed to create a “local and national” bourgeoisie as the basis of modernization and economic growth. Similarly to Boratav, according to Buğra (1994), in the late modernized countries such as Turkey, a new class of bourgeoisie emerged with the state spontaneously, and the new class was created by the state. Such creation was motivated by having a national bourgeoisie to lead economic development for the whole nation. Boratav (2005, p.41) argues that, through the Is Bank's efforts, capital owners and the government were connected. With the banks' active role, the state's economic policies were shaped according to the interest of the capital owners.

Keyder (1987, p.136) also argues that such a coalition between bureaucracy and national bourgeoisie showed similarities with Italian fascism, but there was no basis for fascism since Turkish capitalism did not have a national bourgeoisie to produce such an ideology. After the Second World War, liberalism under the American Hegemony opened the path for the bourgeoisie to have their own political party and win the elections. Keyder also argues that import-substitution industrialization creates a capitalist state in the 1960s and 1970s under peripheralization.

According to Boratav (2016), at the moment of crisis, as at the end of the 1970s, Business associations such as TÜSİAD and TOBB came together to retake political power. Boratav points out in the Turkish case bourgeoisie did not hesitate to use a military coup to change the government in order to manage the crises in 1977-1979.

As Boratav points out how business associations come together, Buğra (1994) argues that Business people and state relations' essential characteristics could be understood by looking into business associations. Even though there were many economic and institutional changes throughout history, the private sector was still weak against the state. Even in the 1980s where the state was committed to reducing its role, instability through the republic's history caused particularist relations and interference to policymaking by the business people. Buğra (1994) argues that,

It was quite clear from the outset that the societal Model that the leadership of TÜSİAD had in mind was deeply inspired by the social structure of developed Western countries in the era of late capitalism. As such, there is no contradiction between this Model and a particular form of "private sector friendly" interventionism, not only through indicative planning or standard fiscal and monetary policy channels but even though state investment in certain areas of the industrial sector. In fact, it was explicitly stated in the Founding Members' Memorandum that the association stood for the principles of a mixed economy model. Although the idea of mixed economy has been gradually eliminated from the agenda in the liberal atmosphere of the 1980s, TÜSİAD has remained faithful to the principle of strategic planning, not only to realize rapid growth of the economy, but also to bring about a better distribution of income to prevent the rise of socially disruptive movements detrimental to the business community more than to any other social group. (p.249)

Boratav (2016) identifies this era as the capital's attack, in contradiction to Buğra; he argues that TÜSİAD and other business associations were pushing for a neoliberal counter-revolution. He argues that the 24 January decisions prove such commitment to privatization and opening the Turkish market to foreign investment. It is also a direct attack towards Turkish worker unions to eliminate resistance.

As indicated in the literature, there are dependency relations between the newly established Turkish bourgeoisie and the state. There were also many studies on conflicts within the capitalist class. According to Pamuk (2008),

What we have been observing in these Anatolian cities in recent decades is an excellent example of industrial capitalism emerging in a predominantly rural and merchant society. These industrialists have been late arrivers both in their own regions and nationally. They are eager to establish themselves and take some power away from the earlier generation of elites. The İstanbul-based industrial elites of the earlier wave of industrialization had established, in 1971, their own organization, the Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association

(TÜSİAD). The new generation of industrialists across Anatolia founded the Independent Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association of Turkey (MÜSİAD) in 1990. In its early years, MÜSİAD supported the Islamist parties led by Necmettin Erbakan, but the members were increasingly alienated by the inward-oriented, anti-Europe rhetoric of these parties. (p.271)

Pamuk's emphasis on taking some power away from the existing hegemonic TÜSİAD has also been emphasized by Öniş regarding neoliberal transformation and globalization. Öniş (2010) argues,

The coalition of winners from neo-liberal globalization expanded from the early 1990s onward to include small and medium term enterprises from inner Anatolia, the so called "Anatolian tigers". The stage by stage transformation of Turkish capitalism is a crisis-ridden process which involves a radical reordering of state-society relations and frequent crises and breakdowns of democracy along the way. (p.48)

As both Pamuk and Öniş state with the 1970s onwards, both upcoming Islamist parties and their allies, small and medium-sized business owners, which will become the MÜSİAD in the future, challenged the relationship between state and big business owners. With the coup in 1980, the Islamist rise in the Turkish political scene became more visible. According to Şen (2010), this could be referred to as the "A Holy Articulation between Turkish Islamism and Neoliberalism." Şen (2010, p.74) also argues that "According to this rhetoric, the secular elite allocated investment funds and other privileges largely to secularist and westernized big business groups—the Istanbul bourgeoisie— portrayed as state-protected, monopolistic, and rent-seeking." A similar point was made by Öniş (1997, p.748), "The professionals, the businessmen and the intellectuals whom we would classify as the rising 'Islamic bourgeoisie', are clearly benefiting from globalization and modernity, yet also feel part of the excluded by not being part of the real elite in society." The rhetoric is used for openly challenging the existing power relations between the state and TÜSİAD. According to Yankaya (2014), global capitalism and flexible production ensured Anatolian cities were connected to the market after the 1980s, leading to new social capitals around Anatolia. This process was also often referred to as the rise of the "Islamic business elite" (Başkan. 2010) or the studies on the rise of discourse on "Anatolian Tigers" Filiztekin and Kent (2021) argues that, within the

literature, the term Anatolian Tigers were compared with East Asian Tigers." However, in an earlier study by Filiztekin and Tunalı (1999), despite accounting for a small percentage of Turkish manufacturing, the additional value and employment growth rate in Anatolian Tigers was remarkable from 1981 to 1993. They also demonstrate that these remarkable growth patterns did not translate into productivity increases. Indeed, Tigers' manufacturing productivity development lagged behind traditional industrial regions and other provinces. Şen (2010) also criticizes the "Supposed Anatolian Revolution." All these articles concern the new challenger within the hegemonic class, namely MÜSİAD, which was highly influential in making the "Turkish Model." Before moving on to the literature on the Turkish Model, the following section focuses on the literature on Homo-Islamicus.

2.2. Homo-Islamicus

MÜSİAD widely used the concept Homo-Islamicus to describe the relationship between Islam and capitalism. A journal published by MÜSİAD to justify and draw its limitations to such a relationship uses the term rapidly. Articles within the Journal have a lot of references to the Qur'an and the life of Muhammed, the prophet since he was also a merchant. According to Zaim (1976), A Muslim should not act like homo-economicus in everyday life. The right attitude of Muslim men should act in line with the principles of Homo-Islamicus. He also argues that even while maximizing profits, man should follow the path of Allah. Following such a path ensures a balance between profit and morality. Zaim's emphasis on morality is a critic of western capitalism. In a similar approach towards Homo-Islamicus and western capitalism, Nasr (1994) argues that rationality is found within the belief in religion and the creator of all things rather than the economic doctrines of the West. MÜSİAD favored such discourses in their quest to create an Islamic market since it justifies economic relations with a different morality and rejects the class conflict since their approach is an Islamic society where there is harmony and balance between the workers and employers. After the neoliberal

transformation in the 1980s and eradication of worker rights served for creating such a society.

Yankaya (2014) argues that the journal published by MÜSİAD in 1994 is a product of the organizational culture of the association. It is also proposed as a management model for Islamist businesses. Over time, these principles were left to the interpretation of the business owners. On the other hand, MÜSİAD continues to send messages to guide and motivate its members concerning Homo-Islamicus and its morality. According to Şen (2010),

What is striking is that homo-Islamicus is introduced as a new economic actor against and alternative to both homo-economicus, the economic actor of the Western market, and homo-traditionalus, traditional Muslim artisans and shopkeepers. In short, homo-Islamicus is endowed with more superior values and qualities than both homo-economicus and homo-traditionalus because he has not only entrepreneurial spirit, morality, and a sense of mission but also the ability to combine his economic activity with politico-religious goals. (p.74)

Şen also argues that such moralities do not match the priorities of MÜSİAD when it comes to neoliberalism and the free market. Hoşgör (2017) points out that Homo-Islamicus is a challenge to the Kemalist modernization project; the Islamist elite argues that Kemalist modernization created a dependency on the West, which is immoral to their understanding of morality. Other than morality, Hoşgör argues that Homo-Islamicus has very similar aspects to protestant ethics. She also states that even though Homo-Islamicus rejects the Kemalist modernization project, there are similarities between their understandings of class relations. Islamic Elites' vision about society depends on Islam preventing distinctions within society, especially regarding the social class. The Kemalist elite developed the same idea, but it was rather a matter of nationality rather than religion, but both indicated identity.

Homo-Islamicus being the ideal actor projected by the elite, applying it under neoliberalism proved challenging. The "Just Order" referencing the Medina market seemed to offer a growth model for the Homo-Islamicus project. According to Yeşilada (1998), The Just system criticized imitations of the Western and socialist growth models; instead, Turkey

should stop the discrimination against Islamists and apply a five-point package. The points are; "domestic peace," "unity between state and nation," "revival of great Turkey," "spiritual growth, and "economic growth." These principles were developed to harmony between neoliberalism and Islam, with benefiting "discriminated" groups of the past. According to Şen (2010, p.73), "However, this lack of consistency and clarity has opened a huge space within Turkish Islamism for neoliberalism and facilitated the interpenetration of neoliberalism into Turkish Islamism."

Hoşgör (2017) argues that the Just Order is not just a matter for internal economic policies; it also involves establishing a common Islamic market and limiting integration with Europe. However, with the crises in Asia in 1997/8 and the unwillingness of the Islamic countries to join such a project. According to Savran (2017), the internal problem with Erbakan's Just Order, the development plan is dependent on developing "heavy industry," which requires a certain level of state interference. Savran argues that such an approach of development reminded the bourgeoisie Kemalist era. The other problem was Erbakan's anti-western attitude negatively affecting relations with the EU. Since the customs union ensured establishing economic links between Turkish companies and Europeans, all the business associations, including MÜSİAD, wanted to protect the free market introduced by Özal's era. Neoliberal policies required reforms more than such radical measures. Hoşgör (2017) argues that globalization complicated alliances between local and international capitals. The competition within the internal market created new alliances between mid-sized local capitals, which ensured small and medium-sized entrepreneurs benefited from the reforms brought by Justice and Development Party. Both TUSİAD and MÜSİAD were committed to AKP's project on privatization and economic development program, which made them commit to the Emergence of the Turkish Model and made the historical bloc, which is the center of the Turkish Model.

2.3. The Turkish Model

When AKP won the elections with EU membership, democratization, and economic reform, namely privatization promises, both Western Media and liberals started to show Turkey as a model for Turkey's economic growth and all the Middle Eastern countries. According to Tuğal (2015, p.8), the Turkish Model can be defined as; "In two words, it was 'Islamic liberalism': marriage of formal democracy, free-market capitalism and (a toned-down) conservative Islam." Kubicek (2013) defines the Turkish Model with elements such as; democracy, economic growth, Islam and modernity, and international prestige. Kubicek also argues that the discourse on the Turkish Model is a *déjà vu* since it keeps coming up regularly from the establishment of the republic; he also indicates that, unlike the Kemalist era, Islam plays a central role in all the characters he listed. Çınar (2006) indicates that the Model emerges from the younger generation of pro-western politicians from the Welfare Party. He argues,

The younger generation, on the other hand, favoured an Islam-sensitive, rather than Islamist, political stance and employed a more comprehensive and consistent language of democracy and human rights. In this way, they hoped to be able to fill the political vacuum created by the 28 February process, to make inroads into Turkey's power structure and to better represent the interests of Islamic identity without risking their own political survival. (2006, p.473-474)

Çınar's analysis of the discourse on AKP and the Turkish Model includes human rights and other characteristics identified by the other scholars. Such discourses are essential to understand the commitment to the EU membership process. Similar attitudes were developed by MÜSİAD towards the west replacing their anti-western attitude. The definition or the existence of the Turkish Model is highly challenged as well as studied. According to Rabasa and Larrabee (2008, p.83),

...Turkish officials, especially the military, have been uncomfortable with U.S. attempts to portray Turkey as a "model" for Muslim countries in the Middle East. The military and the secular political establishment fear that the emphasis on the Middle East could weaken Turkey's Western identity and strengthen the role of Islam in Turkish society.

Such a disagreement influenced military and government relations and changed the balance within the historical bloc AKP mobilized. Rabasa and Larrabee argue that “AKP wants to reduce the political influence of the military and to create more space for Islam in the public sphere.” AKP and the Islamists within the historical bloc were determined to reduce military importance to experiences. Therefore, the “Model” discourse is a problem before even including the actors and elements. Kenyon (2012) argues that The Turkish Model is an achievement, and it could be exported to other countries to fight against “secular despotic regimes in the Middle East, the Model can direct them to a better future not by fighting against political Islam. Kenyon’s article exemplifies how Western liberal media outlets saw the Turkish Model. In the rest of the article, Kenyon also provides other views, such as his interview with Soner Çağaptay, an expert in Turkish politics, who argues that the Model is an economic miracle rather than a political one.

Similarly to Çağaptay’s argument, according to Kirişçi (2011, p.46), “The demonstrative effect is mediated through Turkey’s economic performance and its “trading state” policies accompanied by a liberal visa policy permitting a freer movement of people into Turkey.” Kirişçi also states that Turkey’s democratization process is a work in progress compared to its economic performance. Altunışık (2005) highlights Western influence on the emergence of the Turkish Model discourse, while she debates if the Model exists or not. She concludes that the Model can be defined as democracy and Islam coming together, and it is an opportunity for soft power exercise in the Middle East under the right conditions. Similarly to Tuğal’s and Altunışık’s definition, Sajjad (2016, p.73) defines the Model as,

A new party with an Islamist background called Justice and Development Party, came to power in Turkey in November 2002. The new party called itself „conservative“ rather than Islamist, and consciously distanced itself from Islamism, adopted a pro-West, pro-EU approach, introduced liberal economic and political reforms and thus, signified the softening of political Islam in Turkey.

Tuğal also argues that the Model was an example to the other Muslim countries since it was against secular corporatism and Iran-style Islamic threat from the western perspective.

Another essential component of the Model depended on a consensus between different actors, which formed a hegemonic historical bloc. Tuğal indicates that,

The modernizers had achieved a lot, including a multiparty democracy, a more or less functioning economy and state, NATO membership and a peaceful relationship with Israel. Yet the price of top-down modernization was the lack of popular élan and the modernizing military's persistent 'tutelage', as a result of which democracy was occasionally interrupted and market reforms stalled. The political 'centre' came to be excessively secularist and alienated from the pro-Islamic, but quite dynamic and flexible, 'periphery' (in fact, the majority of society). (2015, p.11)

Öncü (2003) approaches the issue of the hegemonic position of state and the Islamic movement, applying Gramsci's formulation of "dictatorship plus hegemony." Öncü argues that,

From the 1960s on, the dominant class has become the "industrial/financial" bourgeoisie (i.e., monopoly capital). Mainly because of its weak hegemony over the polity, the dominant class has had to govern under various coalitions of the ruling classes. Thus it failed to translate its economic supremacy into social and cultural supremacy. The social failure of the dominant class has been apparent in the "survival of an Islamic ethos in social life" and the rise of Islamic political parties contesting the bourgeois nationalism of the state. In this context, the dominant class has counted to a great extent on the power and material force ensured by the "Laws" and its hegemony in the coercive state organizations. (2003, p. 324-325)

The dominant class Öncü refers to is mainly the core of TÛSİAD, which was over the years and still criticized by being politically inactive. Another crucial point he makes is; how Islamic parties contest the state's identity and, therefore, open space for Islamists. In line with that argument, this thesis argues that MÛSİAD with the state took the "role of social and cultural supremacy" TÛSİAD could not manage as Öncü described it.

AKP coming to power was understood as an alienated group coming to power. On the other hand, it did not seem like the periphery dominating center, or they switched places; AKP was seen as the continuity of the Özal period, marked by rapid privatization and commitment to neoliberal restructuring of the state. Even though the party was split from the

Welfare party, AKP were not the ancestors of the welfare party; on the contrary, they seemed as the reformist wing of the Welfare Party. Therefore, when AKP came to power, they were able to mobilize different actors around the Turkish Model. According to Türkeş (2016, p.192)

AKP's neo-Ottomanism to be a hegemonic project resulting from complex, dynamic processes involving external and domestic forces. In participating in this 'holy alliance', the primary objective of the external forces—the USA, European Union (EU) and international financial institutions—was to accelerate the pace of neo-liberal transformation in Turkey and realize their foreign-policy objectives in the Middle East, the Balkans and Cyprus. Domestic forces—namely, large, medium and small capital, the religiously based business network of the Gülen community and liberals as core elements, with left-liberals and various Kurdish movements as auxiliary supporters—participated for reasons ranging from economic and political interests, religious and identity-based concerns, and the AKP's vague promise of democratic state–society relations.

Even though Türkeş's paper focuses on Turkish Foreign policy and neo-Ottomanism, he identifies internal and external actors and their motivations from a neo-Gramscian perspective. The domestic actors Türkeş points out were mobilized around the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and its dedication to neoliberal restructuring of the state. AKP's hegemonic position depends on not just the involvement of TÜSİAD but as Türkeş indicates the small and medium-size capital MÜSİAD. Before moving on to MÜSİAD's involvement, Hoşgör argues that,

The party's hegemonic conquest thus rested on its ability to reconcile the conflicting demands of diverse economic sectors: Türkiye Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği (Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association, TÜSİAD) often repeated its satisfaction with the government's macroeconomic performance and its economically oriented vision of politics. In its periodic assessments, TÜSİAD praised the AKP's commitment to the IMF program, and credited it for its concerted efforts to deal with the problem of corruption and its bold moves to keep up with structural reforms. (2015, p.206)

For MÜSİAD issue was less challenging since AKP's party program involved supporting small and medium sized businesses; however, TÜSİAD demanded faster privatization even though they were satisfied with the growth performance. According to Yankaya (2014), AKP and MÜSİAD was a project of Islamization with organic ties between the party and the association. Founding members of AKP, such as Gül and Erdoğan, both became the president

later, were members of MÜSİAD before they were elected. Other than two founding figures, 23 elected members of the parliament originated from MÜSİAD. This number increased to 30 in the second term of the AKP. Yankaya claims the direct connection between two institutions is an indication that a new bourgeoisie emerges with the support of the new government. With such relations, MÜSİAD became where members started to hold political power. It also became the center of clientelist relations between capital and state. Another opportunity was to become a member of the ruling elite. Yankaya argues that such characteristics indicate MÜSİAD is dependent on the state and has a particular role in Turkish politics.

According to Koyuncu (2003), MÜSİAD had a changed attitude towards the EU. In the 1990s, when MÜSİAD was founded, they were against Europeanization and had an anti-western attitude, but with AKP, their discourse shifted to a supportive tone. Especially regarding issues of individual freedom and religious freedoms. Koyuncu argues that MÜSİAD reports indicate a total commitment to democratization and economic transition. On the contrary, Yankaya (2014) indicates that MÜSİAD seems to support the EU membership process, but this is rather an opportunist stance. When MÜSİAD realized Europeanization served their political and economic goals, they demanded compromise from the government in their foreign policy. Even when these issues started to cause stalemates between Turkey and the EU, MÜSİAD wanted to pursue the EU membership process since it still had economic benefits. Such political setbacks first brought what Yankaya (2014, p.131) refers to as "soft nationalist Euroscepticism." According to Sol News (2012), in 2009, MÜSİAD president Yazar's statement "We are the real Bourgeoisie" is an indication that Muslim businessman, as he refers to as Islamist Calvinists or the new middle class, does not see themselves as the victim of the West instead of a partner to themselves. Such discourses emerged out of the understanding of the Turkish Model. The confidence Islamist actors were within the historical bloc emerged within the AKP, not just the MÜSİAD dependent upon

external factors such as the EU and USA. TÛSİAD's involvement was also dependent on external support.

Even the actions regarding the democratization efforts of AKP were questioned after new conflicts emerged. According to Tepe (2005),

But can problems of democracy be reduced to problems of state structure and freer markets? Can there be a democratic revolution without democrats? Can citizens become more than spectators in the process of democratic reform? The AKP's program of institutional change seeks to remove many of the obstacles that would prevent Turkey from becoming a more liberal democracy. But not even the cleverest and best-intentioned institutional redesign can create or consolidate liberal democracy as an actual set of practices. (p.81)

Tepe points out the problems that might AKP face, which later proved to be valid concerns.

According to Savran (2017), the civil war between AKP and TÛSİAD started as early as 2006. The new Turkish Islamism identity brought by AKP was a challenge to the TÛSİAD approach to secularism. Savran also points out Erdoğan openly challenges TÛSİAD with his speech on the capital is shifting hands; if one is not a side in this struggle, one should suffer. TÛSİAD was inactive in this period. In the same period, AKP reduced the military's power; the military was an ally to the TÛSİAD in the past. Savran also argues that the struggle between AKP and TÛSİAD is the internal struggle of the Turkish bourgeoisie; it is a classical struggle for who will get the most profits economically, in addition to its ideological conflicts with TÛSİAD. Challenging TÛSİAD from time to time serves the hegemonic position of the party; on the other hand, Savran reminds that without accepting the existence of a civil war between Islamist bourgeoisie and TÛSİAD, one cannot understand AKP's existence. Savran also points out that until 2013, the civil war was fought on one front, and the war had its difficulties regarding the relationship between the state and the bourgeoisie. With Gezi Park's protests, the civil war spread to multiple fronts. Savran is also critical towards using the term passive revolution since it was vaguely used and applied to many crucial historical periods.

Such criticism was accurate when TÜSİAD's response to AKP reforms was vague; however, the nature of the AKP and TÜSİAD relationship was also highly debated. According to Tanyılmaz (2017), the problems between MÜSİAD and TÜSİAD might go to two different paths as they were before, it could end with a consensus, or it could go as a civil war, as Savran points out. Even though Tanyılmaz explains different approaches to the relationship between state and business associations, he states that the Islamist bourgeoisie got a lot of political power during the AKP era, and they also had economic gains within the process, which made them a part of bigger bourgeoisie of Turkey, which was a title hold by TÜSİAD in the past. After the second election win of tension between some groups started to grow; also, according to Buğra and Savaşkan (2014), the state does not just organize the market; it also creates capital accumulation opportunities to groups it is politically aligned. The following section analyses the literature on such an attitude of the state causes.

2.4. The Rise Authoritarianism and Turkish Islamism

In 2010, Ümit Boyner, the president of TÜSİAD, asked a question about Turkish economic models' future in an interview made with her. She states, "We do not know if Turkey will become a bigger version of Finland or a smaller version of China" (T24, 2010). She states this questioning before the referendum on constitutional changes, where AKP's historical bloc was united. The slogan for the campaign was "It is not enough, but yes" Boyner's interview has the same attitude, but they were satisfied with the neoliberal restructuring of the state. Eleven years after Boyner's interview, a similar model debate resurfaced. Recently Erdoğan also used the Chinese Model to justify the rising interest rates (SoL Haber, 2021). The example of China scared investors, and it was denied days later, but TÜSİAD's wish to become bigger Finland seemed to be long gone, with China used to justify ongoing crises and governments inability to control the Turkish Liras currency depreciation.

According to Tansel (2018), within the literature, there are different approaches to the rising authoritarianism in Turkey. Tansel argues,

Our contributions do not refute the argument that AKP's post 2011–2013 trajectory has been shaped by *increasingly* authoritarian modalities of governance. However, we contend that prioritising the 2011–2013 period as a *decisive break* from an earlier AKP-led period of democratisation and as the key juncture that produced the structures of an authoritarian regime to come is problematic on conceptual, analytical and empirical grounds. Underscoring this break, often inadvertently, has led scholars to analyse the transformation of the Turkish political regime on the basis of two competing, temporally bound images of AKP (2018, p.198).

Tansel criticizes taking AKP's early years as the "golden years," also highlighting it as a "model" as misleading. Öniş (2016, p.143) argues that "Looking back on the year, we can see how it highlighted the vitality of both democratic and authoritarian forces in Turkey." Öniş defines more of a hybrid regime, which is one of the discourses Tansel criticizes. Öniş and Kutlay (2020) also argues that,

Turkey's orientation in the direction of the predominant models of authoritarian capitalism, in order to strengthen its grip on political power at home. This approach does not mean totally turning away from the West. There still exists a desire to reconstitute mutual relations with the West on strictly transactional terms, stripped away from its normative foundations. Relations with the United States and the NATO continue to be important in security terms, while the EU remains a major economic partner. The key point is that the Turkish ruling elite no longer considers the West to be the key anchor or reference point. (p.14)

Here Öniş emphasizes the continuation of the economic relations with the West while using a populist discourse in the country. Similar use of antagonizing discourse but still having a certain level of relations was made with TÜSİAD as in the case with the EU, which formed a certain balance for a long time. Tansel also argues that neoliberal authoritarianism starts from the beginning rather than a critical juncture like the Gezi protests. Tuğal made a similar criticism towards scholars and journalists from the West. Tuğal (2015, p.17) argues that "Erdoğan's authoritarian style: everything else about the Turkish Model was good, the implication went. Turks and Kurds had been enjoying liberal-conservative heaven up until 2011." Tuğal argues that such definitions of authoritarianism also come with cultural reductionism. Tansel also categorizes authoritarian neoliberalism in Turkey as,

(1) the centralisation of economic and political decision-making (i.e. executive centralisation); (2) transformation of the rule of law through executive and judiciary interventions; (3) reorienting key administrative and bureaucratic functions of the state in line with the governing party's strategic interests; (4) reconfiguring media ownership through state interventions; (5) de-collectivising workplace organisation and labour relations; and (6) reproducing discourses of mobilisation and consent generation that are based on existing gendered, racialized and class-based hierarchies. (Tansel, 2018, p.200).

Tansel definitions of Turkey's authoritarian neoliberalism characteristics indicate how some actors such as TÜSİAD have their difficulties with the state. Since as was indicated above, AKP was still very much committed to neoliberal doctrines, but on a political level, it was dragging the system to an authoritarian regime. TÜSİAD was not bothered; on the contrary, it enjoyed neoliberal policies in the first period of AKP, but centralization and state interventions were a problem that started in 2011. According to Özden, Akça, and Bekmen (2017, p.192)

...focusing on the constitutive elements of hegemony and their transformations, we prefer to contextualize the AKP's 'shift' as a change from an *expansive* to a *limited* hegemonic strategy. In expansive hegemony, 'a hegemonic group adopts the interests of its subalterns in full, and those subalterns come to "live" the worldview of the hegemonic class as their own'. In a limited hegemony, 'the hegemonic class fails to genuinely adopt the interests of the popular classes and simply neutralizes or "decapitates" them through depriving them of their leadership.

The conflicts within the historical bloc caused to shift to the limited hegemony. The shift is not just limited to TÜSİAD; the other actors such as Kurdish movements and liberals started to question after the referendum. According to Canyaş, Canyaş, and Gümrükçü (2015),

Since the 2007 general elections, there has been growing concern among liberal and secular segments of Turkish society about increasing authoritarianism under AKP rule. In particular, Erdoğan's rather authoritarian style and views have shaped the political environment, especially after the 2011 general elections. The discontent of liberal Turkish people reached its peak in May 2013, when the Gezi Park demonstrations began in İstanbul before spreading to other cities across the country throughout the summer. The government was planning to replace Gezi Park in İstanbul's Taksim Square with a replica of the Ottoman Topçu Barracks in a project which included a shopping mall and residences.

The authors argue that the polarization after the 2011 elections peaked with the Gezi Protests. The protests where an indication of consensus emerged around AKP were dissolving, which was reflected in 2015 elections results. Esen and Gümüşçü (2018) argue that in 2009 the

government pressured Doğan Media group. It was a method of coercion to discipline the business groups to create an obedient business class. Esen and Gümüşçü (2018),

The business actors, who were nurtured by the ruling AKP, reciprocated these favours with their investments in pro-government media, in-kind donations to the party as well as to pro-AKP charities, and campaign contributions. Investments in the pro-AKP media is particularly important in the context of the rising competitive authoritarianism in Turkey, as the ruling party's favourable access to media forms one of the primary pillars of the skewed political playing field. (p.361)

The authors also indicate ways pro-AKP groups benefit from such as “privatization as a method of resource allocation and capital accumulation”(p.357), “tax audits have become largely politicized and used for partisan purposes under AKP rule”(p.358), “debt collection through the Saving Deposits Insurance Fund” (the fund is also used to punish opponents Gülen organizations faced such a punishment) (p.359), and “Bankruptcy trustees have recently played a key role in taking over the control of companies and foundations affiliated with government critics”(p.360). Such coercive actions of the state towards business associations or civil society marked the period after the coup attempt (in 2016). According to Hoşgör (2017),

But to no less extent it is because the AKP has increasingly excluded the "dominant but non-hegemonic groups" and the masses from the field of policy making via depoliticizing the state. However, maintaining a hegemonic appeal ultimately depends on the ability to reproduce active consent through real (albeit limited) material concessions and exercise intellectual, moral, and political leadership, while maintaining a unified power bloc.

Keeping a hegemonic position through coercion rather than consent with de-mobilizing the historical bloc that emerged around AKP in the early years could be referred to as the passive revolution. Tuğal (2015) argues,

The Turkish passive revolution restored the post-1980 neoliberal-conservative regime through the absorption of Islamic revolutionary cadres, discourses, and policies. The economic liberalism, cultural conservatism, and political authoritarianism that the 1980 coup initiated were first ‘democratized’ by the Özal regime. Despite an initial decade of popular enthusiasm, liberal conservatism stagnated and alienated broad strata in the 1990s. The neoliberal actors could save Turkey’s post-1980 direction only through merging with their former enemies. The Islamists inherited their overall package (the ‘restorative’ dimension of the passive revolution) and modified it through radical policies and discourses (its ‘revolutionary’ face). The results

are gradually turning out to be almost as fatal as Italian fascism for their erstwhile benefactors.
(p. 26-27)

As Tuğal indicates, the Turkish Model was first mobilized with neoliberal policies and Turkish Islamist identity around AKP, but when the consent was not achieved after the second term of AKP, the bloc was de-mobilized by the state emerged as the Turkish passive revolution and coercion. As this chapter indicates, the authoritarianism discourse had different beginning points within the literature; on the other hand, as Tansel argues, neoliberal authoritarianism did not pop out after Gezi or the second elections AKP won; it was always within neoliberal policies. What changed was the actors within the historical bloc, as Tuğal points out. The following section focuses on a discourse used as a tool to de-mobilize the Turkish Model and Islamist passive revolution.

2.5. “Local and national” Discourse

“Local and national” production discourse emerged due to rising authoritarianism criticisms of the West and the 2008 crises in Europe. The new Turkish bourgeoisie, as indicated in the first part of this literature review, already had an anti-western element in their roots. Therefore, when the economic opportunities EU offered started to be limited, the new bourgeoisie pushed the state to open more political and economic opportunities, especially through Islamist countries in the Middle East. Duran (2014) defines the emergence of civilization discourse as, "Turkey's national interests, this new image of a new civilization also represented the self-confidence of the Islamic movement in Turkey against Kemalism and the West." The civilization approach failed with the Arab Spring in the Middle East when AKP's allies Muslim Brotherhood failed to establish a hegemonic position. Therefore, “local and national” production discourse emerged when the state was dragged into crises both in internal (conflicts with TÜSİAD and Gülen organization, and Gezi Protests) and external affairs (the conflicts in the Middle East) as a strategic autonomy discourse emerged in 2014. However, it was widely used after the coup attempt in 2016. According to Gürhanlı (2020,

p.171), AKP shifted its discourse from populism to Erdoğanism, when it was transformation, "... process itself has nonetheless fulfilled a crucial function in AKP's discourse: constituting its *new, and even more ambiguous other*." Such a transformation in the discourse creates antagonism between us and them. Gürhanlı (2020, p.173-174) also argues that "Many observers of Turkish politics also noted that since the outbreak of Gezi Protests, such nativism/nationalism has determined the overall discourse of the party..." Since Gezi marks a point where the party faces both external and internal pressure." When AKP lost its allies after Gezi, the historical bloc was de-mobilized by the party with such application of native or "local and national" discourses. Gülhanlı (2020) argues,

Any new cleavages or demands are instantly articulated into this existing system of pro- vs anti-Erdoğanism, leaving no space for a third position – not in party politics, business life, neighbourhoods or even families. The fact that there seems to be no way out of this deadlock at the moment but a divorce, a complete division of Turkish society into two distinct people(s)...(p.192)

Such use for the "Local and national" discourse loses its "production" side and applies as a matter of political goals and identity. An example can be given from AKP's labeling efforts for the opposition party CHP. According to Yılmaz, Caman and Bashirov (2020),

CHP did not confront the AKP's exclusionary narrative that constructed the political forces as enemies of each other: those who are "native and national" on the one hand, and "foreign and other" on the other. The latter group included the pro-Kurdish HDP, liberal intellectuals, as well as Gulenists. Especially in the post-abortive coup period, this discourse, which also portrayed Turkey under existential threat of invasion by foreign enemies and their internal agents, gained strong legitimacy and support both in political and societal level in Turkey. (p.270)

"Local and national" discourse has a conservative and protective nature. According to Kasaba (2018), local, native, or national concepts were first used in the 1920s. His reference to the modernization process is related to the state's efforts to create a national bourgeoisie. Nationalists and Islamists also historically use it for different purposes, which could be seen as a reactionary Islamist movement to creating the Turkish bourgeoisie. According to Bora (2016), the early meaning of local was used by Alparslan Türkeş as a romantic approach to

Anatolia. He also argues that Erbakan transformed both “local and national”; his approach to the terms was more Islam orientated, especially his idea of national. His use of “local and national” was to challenge TÜSİAD and create a more Islam orientated new national Bourgeoisie. Unlike AKP's use of “local and national” production, Erbakan was committed to creating a heavy industry in Turkey. Erbakan's economic ideas were the reject globalization and trying to create a "fair system" in Turkey was not received well even from his old allies in Islamists SME's. MÜSİAD and other Islamist business associations saw the opportunities globalization and neoliberalism could bring them; therefore, the party split into two between reformist and traditionalist. The reformist part became the AKP. Therefore, AKP is aware of what might happen if the government pushes for “local and national” production. According to Çınar (2018),

The discourses of “Native and National” and its prelude to “civilization” cause the AKP (1) to hide that democracy is a matter of power distribution and organization, (2) to reduce democracy to the dominance of an identity, and (3) to ensure its absolute dominance as the bearer and representative of this identity served to make it a “natural right”. Thus, all kinds of democratic processes, institutions, norms and rivals have been rendered expendable and destroyable because they do not recognize this "natural right", do not surrender it and/or make it difficult to use. The norms of pluralism, rule of law, separation of powers and finally fair and free elections are among these expendables. Therefore, "democratization" carried out with the discourse of "Native and national" has meant the authoritarianization of Turkey.
(Translated)

As Çınar points out, the power native or “local and national” possess is to alienate other actors from the political power rather than economic transformation. Yılmaz et al. (2020) argue that the discourse legitimizes authoritarianism for the new coalition block in addition to alienating the opposition. According to Kasaba (2018),

Under the rule of Turkey's Justice and Development Party (AKP) the definition of the concepts of national and native play an important role. The party has three main groups of constituents: the first is a small group of extremely wealthy individuals who owe their fortune to the party. The second is the middle class whose growth is relatively recent and resulted from the policies of the AKP, especially in the early years of its rule. Lastly, a sizeable segment was historically left outside of Turkey's development policies and did not necessarily benefit from AKP's policies but is now ready to respond to the anti-western, nationalist, and Islamist rhetoric. (T24, Translated)

Kasaba points out an essential part of the emergence of the discourse, the relationship

between state and bourgeoisie, and it creates certain advantages to some groups. Erdoğan's direct usage of the term “local and national”, while referring to MÜSİAD, is a good example; on a MÜSİAD congress in 2019, Erdoğan states, "MUSIAD has shown its national and local stance by being with us in every struggle we give." On the contrary, he often refers to TÜSİAD as the interest rate lobby (Savran, 2017). According to Tanyılmaz (2017), there is a conflict between MÜSİAD and TÜSİAD, but this conflict can go both ways to a civil war or to a historical consensus, which depends on what kind of crises they face. Therefore, as Tanyılmaz points out, within the fractions of the bourgeoisie, a consensus is always at the table, but “local and national” discourse could be applied to any context it necessitates. It could merge with securitization discourse and become a potent weapon. Duran (2020), while trying to legitimize the usage of the discourse, also merges it with the securitization discourse with a AKP sided history reading exercise,

In this regard, it is possible to suggest that the AK Party's emphasis on the native-national dates back to the Gezi Park revolts and the December 2013 judicial coup attempt. Needless to say, this sentiment reached its peak during the July 15 resistance. The idea that Turkey was under Western attack resulted in the transformation of the native-national stance into an identity of resistance. This language, which was used against FETÖ during the Peace Process, became more common in the wake of the PKK's return to violence in July 2015. It was the July 15 resistance, however, that made the native-national discourse part and parcel of mainstream politics in Turkey, as the various political parties and their leaders had to position themselves vis-à-vis this definition of the native-national. Moreover, the reluctant response of Western countries to the coup attempt effectively ended the hegemony of Westernist politics in Turkey, which had been intact for more than a century. Questioning its alliance with the West, Turkey has been moving to redefine that relationship. (P.22)

Duran's analysis on “local and national” discourse is very similar to AKP's view, as it could be understood from the quote that it has nothing to do with the economy, but rather it is about the identity and political goals of AKP. He also tries to alienate other parties by mentioning taking their positions, which indicates how it is also a weapon forcing people to distinguish between "us" and "them." It is also a great example given by Hoşgör (2017); Islamist Journalists even used the Gramsci's concepts and produced a right-wing Gramscian understanding as Duran saw “local and national” discourse as a challenge against Western

hegemony. The “local and national” discourse was a very effective tool used by AKP to demobilize the historical bloc constructed by the AKP around the ideals of the Turkish Model after the crises of globalization. Focusing on the discourse is an opportunity to understand the transformation and emergence of authoritarianism in Turkey, even though the future of the economic development model debate is still very vague. In the next section of this thesis, the “local and national” discourse will be analyzed concerning state and business association relations and how it is used as a political goal and a matter of identity of Turkish Islamism.

3. Discourse Analysis

The discourse analysis part consists of three different sections that emerged during the data collection and discourse analysis. These subtitles are also used as codes in MAXQDA to classify the “local and national” discourse. Even though the codes are studied under different subtitles, they also overlap in many cases, as will be identified within the sections.

According to Data available from Google Trends (2022), the people searched the phrase “Local and National” mostly in the year 2019. It remind relatively high between the years 2019 to 2021. The data is available from 2004- today (2022), but it makes its first major elevation in 2015 a month before the general elections. Before that breaking point, the phrase was almost never searched. In the related searches other trending topics are, “Local and National Weapons”, “What is the Meaning of Local and National”, and “Local Production.” The related searches could be interpreted as, it is not clear to people the meaning of “local and national”, and how it is used. With the codes, this research encounters the question of how “local and national” discourse is used.

The first section consists of President Erdoğan’s speeches and news about “local and national” production; therefore, the discourse is used to identify economic relations between state and business people associations. Apart from its other applications, the term originates from this economic meaning. It also consists of criticism for using the term economically both

from the nature of Turkish economies dependence on the global market, states commitment to neoliberal policies, and some of the sources selected for the data collection criticize such usage of the term. They even use the term sarcastically to criticize the government due to discourses' lack of clarity and contradiction with the existing economic conditions of the country. The “local and national” “production” also includes another code at the center of this thesis; the debate on de-mobilizing the Turkish Model consists of a historical bloc identified in the literature review. “Local and national” production model identify a “local and national” production "model" that is not even on the table for the future of the Turkish economic policies; it is instead about power relations.

The second section focuses on the “political and ideological” code, which identifies the political agenda-setting and ideological usages of the “local and national” discourse. The aim of analyzing political and ideological identifies how Justice and Development Party use “local and national” discourse as a tool, and President Erdoğan draws a line between their new political alliance and "others." In this section, “local and national” discourse loses its "production" appendix and becomes more political and ideological. It is used to define both the new presidential system and the enemies of the state. This section focuses on MÜSİAD's reports and journals; it also shows how state and business association relations create the political meaning of the “local and national” discourse.

The last code consist in “identity”, which corresponds to the use of “local and national” discourse to define the new identity emerging out of the de-mobilization of the "Turkish Model." As a product of relations between state and business associations, it emerges from ideological separation from the other political opposition and TÜSİAD. TÜSİAD was also labelled as an "Interest rate lobby"; because of its commitment to the "West." The label has a function of coercion. The nature of the relationship between TÜSİAD and the state is identified as a civil war within the literature. Contrary to TÜSİAD's position,

President uses “local and national” directly to describe MÜSİAD. This part contributes to the existing literature describing such conflict between state and business people associations benefiting from Gramsci's theoretical framework on hegemony, civil society, and passive revolution.

The sources, this research uses are chosen to cover all the “local and national” discourses' applications. Therefore, it involves first-hand resources such as the Presidency of the Republic of Turkey Directorate of Communications and the state-owned Anadolu Agency. These two sources provide direct quotes or whole speeches from president Erdoğan or other ministers. Additional to the direct quotes, Anadolu Agency provides news that directly supports government policies, including “local and national” production. Like Anadolu Agency, the Sabah group is also very close to the government. Their news generally overlaps with the Anadolu Agency; this thesis also examines the journal Daily Sabah, which is available online and published in English; it provides ideological support to the government and criticizes any opposition to it. It also serves as propaganda for non-Turkish speakers as it provides support to any governmental policy. Hürriyet, one of the top-selling newspapers in Turkey, also primarily supports government actions with muted criticism. Unlike other sources discussed above, it claims to be unbiased. Hürriyet also has a symbolic value; the newspaper was first fiscally punished by the government and had to be sold to another holding, which is very close to AKP. This event is used as an example of civil war between "secular" or "old" bourgeoisie and "Islamist" or green capital aligned with the AKP.

Birgün and Sol News represent the view of the traditional left. They cover news about “local and national” discourse critically. Similar to Birgün and Sol News, Cumhuriyet and T24 provide critical news on the subject of “local and national” discourse. Their audience consist of social democrats and center-left readers. In addition to these critical newspapers, this thesis uses Deutsche Welle (DW) and British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC); these two

sources are chosen to provide an international view of the discourse. Their Turkish branches are similar to Cumhuriyet and T24, critical of governments' policies.

In addition to these media outlets, this study uses MÜSİAD's reports, journal (Çerçeve), and TÜSİAD's reports and statements. These sources provide an overview of state and Business associations' relations regarding “local and national” discourse.

3.1. “Local and national” "Production" Discourse

When it comes to using “local and national” discourse, president Erdoğan and other state officials often use it as a reference to the defense industry. President also compares his government's performance with previous governments; but he never addresses his criticism of any specific government or political party from the past. In 2020, from an interview Erdoğan gave and as Presidency of the Republic of Turkey Directorate of Communications shares it;

“Local and national” production plays a major role in the fight against terrorism. How is Turkey doing in the field of the defense industry?

In the defense industry, we took the locality rate from 20 percent and increased it to over 70 percent. While only 62 defense projects were carried out in 2002, this number has approached 700 today. We have started about 350 new projects in the last 5 years. While defense projects with a budget of approximately 5.5 billion dollars were carried out in 2002, we have reached a project volume of 60 billion dollars with an increase of approximately 11 times. (2020, translated)

The question asked by the interviewer is an example of how production discourse merges with political agenda and economic usage of “local and national” discourse. Erdoğan also justifies the “local and national” "production" discourse with counter-terrorism and strategic autonomy discourses. In his following speech president uses counter-terrorism as the justification for defense industry spending and the importance of “local and national” production. One of the examples President Erdoğan uses “local and national” production in similar rhetoric as;

...imagine that while the national and local power in the defense industry was 20 percent, we have now increased them to 70 percent. All these investments will continue. Turkey is a country that is getting stronger in all these areas. Thanks to our dedication, those old troubled times in the Southeast and the East are now history. Is it enough? No. What is it we always

say? We will continue this struggle until there is not a single terrorist left. (Presidency of the Republic of Turkey Directorate of Communications, 2020, translated)

President Erdoğan also uses “local and national” “production” to criticise both the EU and opposition parties. In such a case, the discourse is used as a tool to indicate Turkey is becoming strategically autonomous. As an example, President Erdoğan (2020) stated that;

They (In this case, by “they” President Erdoğan refers to Republicans Peoples Party) criticize our armed and unarmed drones. They criticize our tank project. They criticize our helicopter project. They criticize our radar, missile, satellite, optics projects. They are criticize our engine project. They are criticize our ship project. They criticize our hydrocarbon exploration activities in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea. They criticize all our “local and national” defense industry projects. They criticize our strong political stance in our region and worldwide. (Anadolu Agency, Translated)

Even though President Erdogan sometimes criticizes the EU and USA for their actions against Turkey. Erdoğan, in 2019, claimed that the Western countries are bothered by Turkey's search for natural gas in the Mediterranean, not because of border disputes with Greece and Cyprus, but the increasing “local and national” production capacity. He once again reminds people the increase of the ratio of production as in the examples given above. The President also invites foreign investors to invest in the Turkish economy, and he occasionally reminds Turkey is still committed to continuing its existing relations with Western countries. “Local and national” still occasionally come up in crises; President, with this discourse, tries to gain public support against external and internal pressure. Another thing that symbolizes 20 years of the AKP era is their commitment to megaprojects, which is very popular amongst populist parties worldwide. AKP and the President are very vocal about such projects. One example that emerges with “local and national” discourse is the government's newly established space program. As in the case of the defense industry, state and MÜSİAD's economic relations are also visible in this area, as Bostan, the vice-chairman of MÜSİAD, he states that;

The issue that Turkey needs most is to have its defense systems complete the process from radar to helicopter, from aircraft to missile, and even to the space shuttle. The reason why we talk more about defense is its urgency. Otherwise, our companies develop many new technologies, not only in defense but also in medicine. The most important agenda of MUSIAD and High Tech Port is to be local and national. (Anadolu Agency, 2018, Translated)

MÜSİAD's dedication to “local and national” production is not just limited to the defense industry, and they formed a council for “local and national” production within MÜSİAD to develop and support projects within members. Another example where MÜSİAD and state used “local and national” production discourse is the project on “local and national” car TOGG. As it was in other cases discussed above, MÜSİAD takes a considerable part in these projects and supports the state to use such a discourse. On the other hand, according to Gündoğdu (Birgün, 2020, translated), "... However, there is neither a factory nor a mass production whose sustainability has been proven in the 'local' automobile project." In the same article, he continues questioning the level of localization and nationalization of the Turkish economy. He points out those foreign investors own the most prominent industrial corporations. In the same article, despite the President's statements on how much they localized and nationalized production, Gündoğdu states that in 2002 when AKP was elected, in the top ten corporations, seven of them were local companies, three of them were %100 local and national. In 2018, within the top ten corporations list, five were local companies; none of them were %100 local and national. These numbers indicate that the state is more committed to privatization than “local and national” production. According to the BBC (2020, Translated), even in the defense industry, “local and national” production depends on imports; therefore, it cannot be “local and national”. "In the statement made by Baykar Company for Bayraktar TB2, it is said, "Thanks to Baykar's technological capabilities, the entire system is produced locally and nationally." However, there are many claims to the contrary. Defense industry expert Daniel Gettinger states that some technologies such as sensor equipment from Canada and target technology for missiles are imported from Germany." As both sources indicated, sustainability of “local and national” production is impossible without the existing relations with the Western countries, which is a crucial point for understanding whether “local and national” production can be a new production model or not, which will be discussed in the next chapter.

3.1.1. “Local and national” Production “Model”

As it was indicated above, “local and national” production is very much dependent on imports, and it is not a sustainable model under the circumstances in Turkey. The state referring to defense industries' level of localization and nationalization of production does not explicitly use this discourse as an economic model. The state side does not orientate policies to create a state owned “local and national” production model. The lack of usage of the word “model” by the state is an indication of “local and national” discourse, is a product of relationship between the state and certain groups of bourgeoisie. MÜSİAD, on the other hand, uses the term model very often, suggesting their members' production efforts are to sustain “local and national” production "model." One of the rare uses by a state official used the words with the order of ““local and national” production model” was used by the minister of internal affairs Soylu in 2021 (Anadolu Agency, Translated). However, his speech's primary subject was related to the presidency system rather than economic policy. The “local and national” production is used to legitimize the presidential system, which is why Soylu's usage of the term model in the sense of production model was very vague.

On the contrary to state officials, MÜSİAD uses the term “Model” more with the word production. As an example, According to Anadolu Agencies news(2017, translated), the President of MÜSİAD defines MÜSİAD as "... a non-governmental organization made of members that adopt the national and local production model, and said that they produce at a serious level in the industry, especially in Anatolia." In this speech, it is crucial to understand why Kaan adds "especially in Anatolia," showing that MÜSİAD is not as homogenous as it was in the 1990s. They are no longer just the representatives of small and medium sized entrepreneurs from Anatolia, they have members from different types and holdings and capital groups. In a similar matter, the President of MÜSİAD in 2016 (Çerçeve-76) stated their support for the “local and national” production model of Turkey, and President Erdoğan's commitment to the Model, legitimizing his position with the statement, "God is

always on the side of rightful one" (p.11, translated). The statement ends with the declaration of MÜSİAD's support for continuity of the EU membership process and the development of more economical and political relations with Europe. The statement was made during the post-coup attempt, therefore in a context where the economic environment of Turkey was very unstable. MÜSİAD's President attempts to find a balance between politically supporting the regime with antagonizing challengers of the state (he uses the term "foreign traitors"); on the other hand, he is trying to show their commitment to European investors and existing partners' relations will continue as it was before the coup attempt.

The balance in the discourse on the side of both the state and MÜSİAD opens a path for criticism. Taking "local and national" production as a model, in theory, contradicts with neoliberal order and free-market structure in Turkey. In this context, Alpman (Birgün, 2019) criticizes the government's actions in the name of "local and national". He argues that "local and national" discourse does not have a standing ground since the government commonly uses "local and national" discourse. However, they continue to privatize national resources. He gives the example of gold mines sold to a Canadian mining company, or in another case, privatization of existing factories; he provides the example of a wagon factory sold to a Korean company. Such examples prove that "local and national" production is still not a priority compared to the importance of foreign direct investment.

Another vital importance is the tank truck company sold to Qatar. According to DW (2020), even in the defense industry, Where President Erdoğan refers as an example of "local and national" production if neoliberal order demands such a trade, "local and national" discourse could be forgotten. Therefore, as a model, "local and national" production was not an economic program, and it was instead a reflection of the relationship between MÜSİAD and the state, which is still very limited and not a priority for Turkish economic policy.

3.1.2. The Contradictions between "Local and National" Model and Neoliberalism

Besides the "local and national" production model debate, other models were proposed,

which contradicts with the neoliberal policies. One such debate was the mention of a Chinese economic model in Turkey. According to DW (2021), against the ongoing exchange rate crises, president Erdoğan suggested a shift toward the Chinese economic model to solve the problem. In comparison to China, Turkey's population and industrial capabilities are very small. Crucial point in his comparison is turning crises into opportunities for foreign investors; with the decrease in Turkish liras currency, Turkish labor in Turkey becomes cheaper every day. In addition, days after Erdoğan's speech on China's economic success and the rising concerns, the minister of economics made another statement. According to Cumhuriyet (2021), the minister argued that Erdoğan was misunderstood. Their intention as the state was to point out the importance of production and the fight against the pressure on increasing interest rates; in the same speech, he reminded the core argument of "local and national" production, he reminds the increase of ratio in defense industries production, without saying "local and national".

Such a speech came after a very crucial report produced by TÜSİAD in 2021. The main argument of the report (Building The Future With a New Mindset, p.21) was; "We can build a developed, reputable, fair and environmentally friendly Turkey through a total mentality change, by taking simultaneous and coordinated steps in the elements of "human development and competency," "science, technology and innovation," and "institutions and rules." The report also suggests the relations between Turkey and the EU in the 2000s were very good, and Turkey was very successful in connecting the global economy, and it should continue on this path. This report and most of the TÜSİAD reports do not directly challenge the government, as the report suggests that TÜSİAD was satisfied with the performance of AKP in its early years, where the dedication to privatization and other neoliberal policies were in order and "fair," therefore this report suggests Turkey's future is the same path established in the early 2000s. The question here, and what was discussed within the literature, was whether AKP returned to the same path. The President of TÜSİAD used a similar discourse;

Simon Koslowski (TÜSİAD, 2021, translated) argues that "First of all, we are getting poorer as a country. The Central Bank should not forget its main target. What is their job? It is to control inflation. The issue of controlling inflation with the current account deficit, which is the subject of today, does not coincide with even the most basic economic rules." TÜSİAD is known for its silence on political matters, even when the matter is dominating Turkey's political agenda. Both the document and Koslowski's speech suggest TÜSİAD is challenging AKP openly, also reminding the readers of the past success of the historical bloc constructed around AKP, where TÜSİAD was a part of the historic bloc that emerged around AKP.

As indicated above, different discourses indicate the bloc was demobilized, leaving TÜSİAD as a challenger to the hegemonic position of AKP. President Erdoğan also openly challenges TÜSİAD when they decide to intervene in political matters; he labels TÜSİAD as the interest rate lobby to criticize their position against the states' economic policies.

President Erdoğan said, "We are struggling to implement a much more radical and more permanent economic change. When we try to achieve our country's goals with a more consistent and balanced economic policy, they raise things as if the apocalypse has broken out. Instead of Turkey's economic interests, global interest rates are rising. By defending the interests of their lobbies, one cannot be national, nationalist, local, democrat, liberal, conscientious, and moral. (Presidency of the Republic of Turkey Directorate of Communications, 2021, translated).

On the contrary, President never criticizes MÜSİAD for being political; in Gramsci's terms, such an aggressive stance could be defined as a war of position in Turkey. Gramsci (2000) uses this term for the political and ideological conflicts within the same class, as in the case of Turkey between MÜSİAD and TÜSİAD; Gramsci (2000) also states that the war of position is an indication of passive revolution. Therefore, the following section tries to identify the war of position regarding the political and ideological uses of the "local and national" discourse.

3.2. "Local and National" Discourses' Political and Ideological Functions

As it was stated above section, "local and national" discourse initially meant to have an economic meaning, but when it loses the word production, and it transforms into something else. An example occurs when President adds the word "stance" at the end. The

“local and national” stance becomes a way of distinct opposition to the allies of the AKP.

According to Duran (2018, Sabah Daily), "the idea of a "national-native stance," which Erdoğan originally mentioned in his first speech upon his release from Pınarhisar Prison, was the essence of the whole manifesto." Duran (2018) summarizes the manifesto as; "...a summary of the political battles of the President and the AK Party as well as his vision for the future. It represents a combination of experience, vision, and covenants. The text was filled with outreach toward domestic audiences and a message of determination while challenging the world outside Turkey's borders." Similarly to Duran, spoke person and vice chairperson of AKP Mahir Ünal argues that,

First of all, the opposition should stop being the spokesperson of anti-Turkey structures and anti-Turkey lobbies. Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu and his friends should take a stance that was suitable for Atatürk's party, which Atatürk called "National Politics" in 1929. Today, the positions of Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu's RPP and his friends are not local and national. These things do not suit RPP, Turkey's founding party (Cumhuriyet, 2018, translated).

President Erdoğan also uses the “local and national” stances to distinguish his party and any opposition. He argues, "One of the biggest problems Turkey is experiencing today is the “mob” consisting of some politicians, former diplomats, and media members who could not manage to take a “local and national” stance on political issues." (Anadolu Agency, 2021, translated). Within the same speech, he accused people who do not support his “local and national” stance of his as obsessed with a specific ideology or people who developed a grudge against him.

With the “local and national” stance president tries to establish a hegemonic position where no one can challenge. The “local and national” stance discourse aims to manufacture consent; if not, the same discourse could have a coercive tone; the President used such a tone against RPP in 2019. After the coup attempt, all the political parties represented in the parliament joined in protecting the democracy demonstrations in Yenikapı, including RPP. Erdoğan referred to the event and stated, "The fact that they ran away from the “local and national” alliance that had formed the ground in Yenikapı had already revealed their true

intentions. Despite this, we expect them to return from the wrong path they took with the supporters of the separatist terrorist organization." (Hürriyet, 2019, translated). In this case, President tries to associate the word terror with RPP. It is a strategy to prevent a new historical bloc from emerging as a counter-hegemonic movement; the discourse on terror aims to isolate Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) from joining any alliances while solidifying AKP's position as the only "local and national" party. It is also an indication of rising authoritarianism in Turkey.

As discussed in the first section, the "local and national" discourse was rarely used as a model by state officials; on the contrary, the "local and national" Model was widely used in political agenda-setting efforts. The presidential system change in Turkey allowed President Erdoğan to be both the head of state and government. This new Model is identified as the "local and national" presidential system. In 2017, Erdoğan defined the new presidential system as "local and national" and nothing like USA's Model; he argued that the new Model should be orientated with the traditions of the Turkish people (Sol News). Similarly, the President of the communications office Altun (Presidency of the Republic of Turkey Directorate of Communications, 2021) argues that the presidential system provided historical opportunities for "local and national" production; according to Altun, "local and national" production makes Turkey a country, which is strong enough to resist any external threat. In addition to Altun's speech, the leader of the Nationalist Movements Party, which is also the party aligned with AKP, makes a similar connection as the Directorate of Communication. Bahçeli (Anadolu Agency, 2021) argues that they have to protect the presidential system from being able to establish the roots of a "local and national" economic system.

MÜSİAD members also made the same line of argumentation, especially after the coup attempt; when MÜSİAD made a political statement, it was supportive of President Erdoğan's discourse. After the coup attempt, MÜSİAD used "local and national" in every opportunity they got. One of the statements made by MÜSİAD (2016) argues; "...there is no

doubt that July 15, 2016, Coup Attempt was designed in the same way against all national development efforts coming from the chest of this country..." (Çerçeve-76, translated, p.9). MÜSİAD dedicated almost the whole issue of their journal to condemning the coup attempt to prove they have no association with the "Fethullah Terrorist Organization." Even in the same journal, the MÜSİAD president admits they have no problem with the state of emergency and support it. As it was stated by the MÜSİAD president (2016),

After the declaration of the state of emergency on July 21, the news in the international press about our country that caused a false perception in public was malicious. Because, in the time that has passed since the State of Emergency decision taken by the state to implement the necessary measures to get the terrorist organization elements formed at various levels out of the system more quickly, no adverse developments have occurred in social and economic processes. For this reason, after the declaration of the state of emergency, while working to explain to the world that everything is going on as normal on the one hand, in the business world; On the other hand, we have taken various initiatives to relieve the bottlenecks in the economy. (Çerçeve-76, Translated, p.9)

MÜSİAD continued to show its support and commitment to the "local and national" discourse of the state. In 2018, MÜSİAD declared they were satisfied with the localization policies of the government, and they appreciated the new economic program and the relations with the EU; according to Anadolu Agencies (2018), the new MÜSİAD saw the EU as a fragile institution, and they should show some commitment as Turkey does in their relations. In the same news, MÜSİAD also points out Turkey's geopolitical importance in its region with "local and national" production and suitable economic Model; MÜSİAD suggests they can overcome the hardships of their region. "Local and national" discourses peek the year 2018 was also the year the USA sanctioned Turkey, MÜSİAD (2018) referred to this issue with the statement;

As Independent Industrialists and Businessmen's Association, we want to be known that we will stand by the elected legitimate government despite sanctions and pressures. We condemn in the strongest terms the unethical political games that our country has been exposed to recently and which are not explained by any economic basis. We stand behind our President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and our economic administration, regardless of the outcome, against all attacks targeting our national economy model on the long road we have embarked on. We will not lose this economic war. (Çerçeve-88, Translated, p.11)

MÜSİAD's commitment to AKP under any conditions indicates their organic relationship. On the other hand, TÜSİAD kept its silence during the Presidential government

system and about the “local and national” discourse. However, with the building of the future report, TÜSİAD started to be more vocal about political matters. According to Sabuncu (T24, 2021),

They [TÜSİAD] reveal the stalemate that the Presidential Government system has brought to Turkish politics. There is no direct sentence 'let this system abolish,' but there is a clear picture of the country's state, from 'absence of balance control to institutional erosion. It emerges from the narratives that "it is almost impossible to continue in this way" (Translated)

The state and minister of Industry and Technology, who criticized TÜSİAD for not understanding their economic program and their persistence on interest rate policies, also made the same interpretation; at the end of the speech, he thanked MÜSİAD for understanding their policy and the real potential of the Turkish economy (Sol News, 2021). President Erdoğan (2021) also made a statement about TÜSİAD, "Hey TÜSİAD and its offsprings, I am calling out to you. You have only one mission: investment, employment, and growth. Do not look for ways to get up and attack the government, and you cannot fight us...you wonder how we can overthrow this government and bring a government that we can exploit" After the presidents' speech, MÜSİAD also joined the attack on TÜSİAD calling their statement an effort to create an environment of insecurity on purpose. (Sol News, translated). Even in a time of crisis affecting small and medium-sized producers, the dedication of MÜSİAD to support and directly conflict with TÜSİAD can be explained by their organic ties with the AKP. The following section analyses the organic bond concerning identity perspective and enforcing that identity through “local and national” discourse.

3.3. “Local and National” “Identity”

As debated in the above sections of this thesis, the Turkish Model was an outcome of the historical bloc that emerged around AKP. As it was also stated in the literature review part, it had been called moderate Islam or Islamic liberalism; in fact, what made this a "model" to other countries was its ability to consolidate such a hegemonic position within a country with different groups with conflicting agendas and ideologies. However, the last years of AKP experience proved that it was not a sustainable political model and alliance. When it

was de-mobilized by AKP, it had also produced a new bourgeoisie co-dependent on the state and its ideology, therefore, with a new identity. The traces of this new identity also could be found in the “local and national” discourse. Duran (2017) defines the “local and national” discourse as,

This rhetoric has been employed in a range of areas, including the war on terror, the new system of government, and efforts to promote a sense of unity and solidarity. In other words, the "national and native" discourse aims to explain one's identity and political goals and develop an inclusive and founding language. It transforms Turkey into a more active player in the international arena – just as earlier references to "conservative democrats" and "our civilization." It is much bigger than the identity of a single political party. Instead, it has become a description of Turkey's shared ideals that cut across social groups. (Sabah Daily)

Duran defines the AKP's effort to sustain its passive revolution with the “local and national”

discourse. His use of "founding language" or shared ideals references this effort. However, Duran's use of "shared ideals" is an exaggeration since the demobilization of the Turkish Model has created many conflicts between AKP and other groups, and the President's use of “local and national” becomes more exclusionary each time he uses it. Such an example is from DW's news (2018),

In his speech on March 24, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, referring to the students protesting at Boğaziçi University, said, "There, faithful, national and local youth are distributing Turkish delight for Afrin. While they are distributing Turkish delight there, those communist, traitor students attempt to scatter their tables. We are doing all kinds of necessary things for these terrorist youth. We will not give up the right to study at the university" (Translated)

In this speech, the President uses communists, traitors, and terrorists in the same sentence to describe protestors of operations in Afrin. Considering the presidents' wide use of the words traitor and terrorist, “local and national” can be described as someone or some group who are not terrorists or traitors can be “local and national”. On the other hand, using "communist" as a negative word is an old political Islamist reflex, which could be historically traced to Islamist movements in the cold war era. The President also stated he wanted 550 “local and national” members of parliaments in the elections, and he defined “local and national” as someone who takes care of the flag. He reminded people that the color red in the Turkish flags represents the blood of the martyrs. (BBC, 2015) He tries to criticize Peoples Democratic Party and increase support from the nationalist wing. In 2018, AKP and NMP

made the alignment to keep the majority votes. Bahçeli also enjoyed using “local and national” discourse; according to Sol News (2021), Bahçeli states that the alliance between AKP and NMP will hold since it is the “local and national” stance against multiple fronted wars starting from the coup attempt.

Therefore, “local and national” becomes a definition of position, where an actor defines itself to AKP can make a person traitor or “local and national”. This can be applied to anything as President Erdoğan uses it for even individuals such as singers. In the awards show, president Erdoğan (2015, Hürriyet) declared the singers (he refers to them as artists, in the Turkish language, the artist is used for someone respected by the whole society) who got an award from him “local and national” artists because they represent the values he set by “local and national” discourse. In this speech, he gives a reference to himself for the definition of the “local and national” artists without defining them. He also uses the term for criticizing artists who protested the government on social media. President (2020, Presidency of the Republic of Turkey Directorate of Communications) states that true “local and national” artist does not engage in political debates on social media; they should be admired for their artwork. Other than coercion purposes, the President also uses “local and national” identity to manufacture consent around issues that benefits the state. Especially during exchange rate crises, Erdoğan (2018, DW) reminds the public that a “local and national” identity demands to use Turkish Lira rather than the dollar and other currencies to beat the people attacking Turkey as it was in the Gezi events. President Erdoğan also said that the Gezi protest was an event organized by foreigners. During the Gezi events, the Turkish Lira lost value; therefore, when Erdoğan talks about exchange rates, he blames the Gezi protestors. To consolidate people against Gezi and invite people to exchange their dollars and other currencies, he reminds people where they should stand on the side of “local and national”.

The President has a problematic relationship with the EU and the Western countries; his speeches change according to conjunction. When he faced sanctions like in 2018, he

turned it into an economic war against the West. Those are the times he is more vocal about “local and national”. According to DW (2018), Erdoğan argued that we should be careful with relations with the EU since our “local and national” stance and our honor are at stake. The speech was given after the EU demanded reforms from Turkey. Similarly, when a representative of the opposition made a statement about Turkey in European Parliament, Erdoğan (2020, Presidency of the Republic of Turkey Directorate of Communications) declared them counter “local and national”. Even when Turkey was sanctioned, President Erdoğan (2020, Presidency of the Republic of Turkey Directorate of Communications) reminded investors they are valued in Turkey, and Turkey and the West have long historical relations; therefore, he suggested a revision to their policymakers. Erdoğan's speeches vary on the circumstances, but the need for foreign investment in the Turkish economy also continues; both TÜSİAD and MÜSİAD members have partners or trading relations with the West; therefore, a conflict between Turkey and the West hurts both of those actors. On the other hand, it is known that TÜSİAD demands Turkey to continue its membership procedure with the EU, as was stated in building the future report.

MÜSİAD, on the other hand, seems more satisfied with the “local and national” identity the President defines. Even the President of MÜSİAD (2021, Çerçeve-98, translated, p.40-41) states that they will act according to "To be able to carry Turkey to new horizons with the principle of 'High Morality, High Technology.'", he also states that they will contribute to the “local and national” production of the country, and "Turkey will be positively discriminated." MÜSİAD also tries to legitimize “local and national” identity by making historical references. As in the case of neo-Ottomanist foreign policy, they give examples from the time of Abdülhamid the second. The article claims that “local and national” production started with the efforts of Abdülhamid, and the Turkish republic inherited those factories (2019, Çerçeve-91). MÜSİAD's efforts to rewrite history serve the “local and national” identity constructed by the AKP.

Similarly, President Erdoğan (2020, Presidency of the Republic of Turkey Directorate of Communications) argues that to be able to accomplish AKP's goals for 2053 and 2071, they have to raise the youth with a “local and national” mind set, similar to MÜSİAD he gives the example of Ottoman emperors past successes. It is not just the matching discourses that define the lines of MÜSİAD and state relations. Erdoğan also directly refers to MÜSİAD as the “local and national”; according to Anadolu Agencies news (2021, translated) "The special structuring for women and youth is also a sign that this organization is moving towards the right dynamics in activating the potential of our country and evaluating the power of national and local capital in all its dimensions." He also stated that MÜSİAD is an institution dedicated to people's values and “local and national” stances. MÜSİAD members also use the “local and national” as an identity to define themselves. According to Anadolu Agencies news (2021), a branch manager of the MÜSİAD to bring MÜSİAD forward, “local and national” entrepreneurs should protect the ecosystem MÜSİAD provides. Similarly, the MÜSİAD president argues that their dedication to “local and national” production model, amongst other things with their capital stock, MÜSİAD is the leading capital group in Turkey (Anadolu Agency, 2019). Defining MÜSİAD as the “local and national” also suits the definition of Homo-Islamicus identity, in fact, “local and national” identity substitutes the meaning of the Homo-Islamicus.

Another pervasive discourse of MÜSİAD is that they identify states' goals as their own and promote their activities as a service to the state. "As MUSIAD, while we undertake the necessary sacrifices for the welfare of Turkey, which is also progressing strongly in the international arena, we once again express that the economic difficulties and political developments in our country will not make us give up." (Çerçeve-92, 2019, Translated, p.9). The use of “local and national” discourse in terms of identity indicates organic bonds between MÜSİAD and the state.

Conclusion

By conducting a critical discourse analysis this thesis examined how the “local and national” discourse has been used as a tool for political, ideological purposes rather than its original economic meaning as a production model by focusing on the relation between state and business associations. Without understanding the relationality between the state, TÜSİAD, and MÜSİAD, the discourse itself remains vague, as several authors indicated within the literature. This research also identified the debate over "Turkish Model" and how it was perceived as an Islamic liberalism component, and how it was transformed to an authoritarian regime with an analysis of the use of “local and national” discourse as an instrument.

The Turkish Model, created and enforced by the historical bloc, the AKP's hegemonic position. The crises of neoliberalism and globalization triggered an organic crisis in Turkey, placing the state in between two historically antagonist business associations back to their original conflicting positions. As Gramsci (2000) defines it, the problems in the economic structure tend to reflect themselves within the superstructure; therefore, it is not a coincidence that the “local and national” discourse emerged as an economic term then became a tool for the demobilization of the historical bloc. In the case of Turkey, the rising authoritarianism coincides with the coercive use of “local and national” discourse, as it was indicated in the discourse analysis part.

Due to the constant changes in the conjuncture in Turkey, the relevance of Gramsci's concept of passive revolution was challenged by many researchers, as indicated in the literature review part. However, the use of “local and national” discourse, points to the existence of a political and ideological function, and how it enforces an Islamist identity, points to the existence of a war of position between TÜSİAD, MÜSİAD, and the state. By promoting almost an identical discourse MÜSİAD proved their organic bond to the AKP; on

the contrary, TÜSİAD challenged to the states' economic policies indicates they hold a different position.

The “local and national” production model is unlikely to be an option for Turkish state in the near future or desired as an entire economic model. As it was demonstrated in the discourse analysis, the most vocal actor on this issue is MÜSİAD; although they do not go as far as supporting a rupture with the EU. They intend instead to protect existing relations while expanding to other markets. Compared to the 1990s, MÜSİAD is much more linked to the global economy, and are no longer merely representing small and medium-sized entrepreneurs, or they have foreign partners and investors, and several MÜSİAD members have managed to grow to the point of claiming the title of “local and national bourgeoisie” of Turkey. The reason MÜSİAD is more vocal about the “local and national” production than any other actor is, as indicated above, that they have been involved in the “local and national” projects, the most obvious example being the defense industry. Challenging the EU or any other Western partners politically hurts MÜSİAD as much as TÜSİAD, MÜSİAD’s commitment to the discourse is also related to their organic bonds with AKP; therefore, there is a dependency relation between them, and it creates the “local and national” production discourse. New development models, such as the Chinese Model, regularly emerge as a response and solution to the Turkish economy's ongoing crises. However, as it made clear from an analysis every actor's statements, this is neither the desired scenario nor is it even possible under the current circumstances. Indeed, the Turkish economy needs foreign direct investment and seeks such relations. As it was seen in the example of ongoing privatizations of state factories working in the defense industry, “local and national” production is not a priority, while the commitment to neoliberal policies continues. I contend that the state was forced to produce such a discourse because of the political problems with the West and its repercussions on state-business associations’ relations.

As both external and internal political actors challenged President Erdoğan and the AKP's hegemony in the political sphere, the "local and national" discourse became an instrument for coercive action. The discourse becomes a powerful instrument to create a divide between actors and a feeling of war against anyone who challenges the hegemonic position of President Erdoğan; therefore, when the discourse is applied, it strengthens the authoritarian position of the president. This economic war against the external and internal actors also shifts the blame away from the state's inability to react and offer solution to the crises. As it was indicated in the discourse analysis, when the discourse functions as an ideological tool, it merges with the word "stance." The "local and national" discourse is always functional in internal affairs by generating cross-class support, but when the state sees an opportunity to have better relations with Western countries, they do not hesitate to take a step back on the "local and national" stance. However, when TUSİAD or opposition parties decide to be more critical of ongoing crises, they face hostility created by the "local and national" discourse. TUSİAD sees the use of the "local and national" discourse and the organic bond between MÜSİAD as a dysfunction of the market and calls for a return to neoliberal policies with a new mind-set. Similarly to TUSİAD, opposition parties are challenging the "local and national" stance of AKP, they blame the government for favouring certain fractions of the bourgeoisie and authoritarian tendencies towards non-AKP supporters.

Another function of the "local and national" discourse consist in enforcing an identity. The use of "local and national" to define someone or a group of people indicates how the Turkish political sphere has been reduced to a divide between supporters and opponents of the president. When "local and national" was need to define an identity, it merges with a particular morality usually religiously orientated. To be labelled by a state official on the opposite side of what is "local and national" automatically equates that group or person as "terrorists" or "traitors." MÜSİAD contributes to this understanding by defining a certain

morality for bourgeoisie and worker relations or arguing that they are acting in the best interest of state. They claim that profit is something secondary for them, which is a reminder of their earlier definition of the Homo-Islamicus. It is not just limited representing Turkey in foreign countries; MÜSİAD even attacks Turkish Republic's history by claiming that the Ottoman Sultan even before the Republic was established made the first "local and national" investments. These attacks are in line with the AKP's discourse on the Republic's history and MÜSİAD's attitude towards modernization. MÜSİAD tries to prove that they are ready to take the title of new "local and national" bourgeoisie of Turkey by using their organic bonds with the AKP.

In conclusion, the AKP's commitment to neoliberal policies continues to exist, and they are even willing to find a balance with the West and TÜSİAD when the opportunity presents itself. TÜSİAD had shown its interest in returning to the situation of the early AKP era and its rapid privatization drive. It was then that the Turkish model discourse emerged, and the historical bloc around AKP built their hegemonic position, which included TÜSİAD. As it was mentioned by a variety of researchers and authors many times within the literature that the "local and national" production model is not sustainable under these circumstances. Even when Turkey was sanctioned economically, the state's "local and national" production model was not an option for the state. Although the discourse does not indicate a model, MÜSİAD members enjoy its privileges, specifically in their relations with the state. The discourse continued existence can only be explained by its political and ideological function, and its use of enforcing the Islamist identity, which serve the ongoing passive revolution following the demobilization of the historical bloc that emerged around AKP.

This thesis contributes to the literature as an example of the use of Gramsci's theoretical framework in a critical discourse analysis. The research also contributes to the existing literature on how a regime is transformed by clarifying a discursive tool used in the

process. While understanding the structural change, the thesis also contributes to the existing literature on state business association relations by focusing on different uses of “local and national” discourse. It also clarifies the “local and national” discourse itself, which was considered vague within the literature. This research can contribute as an example to future research on the rise of authoritarianism in Turkey and the use of Gramsci’s concept passive revolution. It can also serve as a model to understand emergence and instrumentalisation of a certain strategic autonomy discourse in populist and authoritarian regimes. Therefore, it is useful to understand the regime itself. With Gramsci’s theoretical framework and critical discourse analysis method could be applied different cases in a comparative perspective. Analyzing a political discourse such as “local and national” in a comparative perspective will enable researchers to understand different strategies or models countries use to overcome the political pressure, ongoing crises of globalization and neoliberalism.

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