Hiyerarşilerde sosyal tercihler: gizli anlaşmalar ve optimal kontratlar üzerine teorik bir çalışma.


Tezin Türü: Yüksek Lisans

Tezin Yürütüldüğü Kurum: Orta Doğu Teknik Üniversitesi, İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi, İktisat Bölümü, Türkiye

Tezin Onay Tarihi: 2016

Tezin Dili: İngilizce

Öğrenci: Kemal Saygılı

Danışman: SERKAN KÜÇÜKŞENEL

Özet:

This thesis aims at obtaining new theoretical insights into behavior of organizational hierarchies by combining standard principal-supervisor-agent framework with theories of social preferences. Extending Tirole’s (1986) model of hierarchy with the inclusion of Fehr and Schmidt’s (1999) distributional other-regarding preferences approach, the links between inequity aversion, collusive behavior throughout the levels of a hierarchy and the changes in optimal contracts are studied. It turns out that other-regarding preferences do change the collusive behaviour between the parties. Moreover, the optimal contract parameters depend on the nature of both the agents’ and the supervisor’s other-regarding preferences.